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I. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The court strategy agenda focuses on the following four issue areas:
(1) access to the courts, (2) secrecy of court documents and settlements,
(3) court bias, and (4) public education and tools.
II. ACCESS TO COURTS
Our judicial system primarily decides disputes in two categories:
criminal cases given priority, and civil disputes between wealthy
interests. Exacerbating the access problem are (1) barriers to deciding
cases on a class, or en masse, basis—particularly by those representing
the poor; (2) standing and immunity doctrines which undermine Title
VII and other civil rights protections; (3) prohibitive costs and delays
inherent in litigation; (4) a lack of streamlined procedures to adjudicate
* March 24, 2001. Moderator: Robert C. Fellmeth, Price Professor in Public
Interest Law, University of San Diego School of Law; Executive Director, Center for
Public Interest Law. Panelists: Alan B. Morrison, Co-Founder, Public Citizen Litigation
Group; Theodore M. Shaw, Associate Director and Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund; Nadine Strossen, President, American Civil Liberties Union and
Professor of Law, New York Law School; Patricia Sturdevant, Co-Founder, National
Association of Consumer Advocates.
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legitimate disputes in a timely fashion; (5) costs of $150–$500 per hour
to employ licensed attorneys; (6) attacks on contingency fees (limits)
which inhibit representation of those unable to pay hourly rates; (7)
increasing reliance on compulsory mediation or arbitration imposed in
adhesive fashion by banks and other corporations; and (8) diminished
supply of publicly funded courts and the concomitant growth of private
adjudication by retired judges to whom public litigants are referred and
who bill at substantial rates.
Are these the major threats to access to the courts? Are there others?
Which are paramount and addressable within the next decade? Possible
strategies to address these access problems include the following:
(1) Class actions are difficult to maintain. What should be done to
promote the representation of the interests of large groups? Should we
distinguish between different types of class actions (for example,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) and (2) actions in equity, as
opposed to the class action damage action under Rule 23(b)(3), which
requires predominance of common questions, superiority, manageability,
and individual notice)?
The Legal Services Corporation (LSC) attorneys representing the
indigent remain restricted in bringing class actions against those who
violate the legal rights of impoverished groups. Does the Supreme Court
decision in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez1 resolve the problem? If it
does not, what alternatives are available to represent the interests of the
poor beyond single client representation?2
Apart from the LSC, should public interest litigants in general shift to
petitions for writ of ordinary mandamus rather than rely on class
actions?3
What are the options to fund major class actions? A separate
corporation? Public or private partnerships? Is there another way to
combine on behalf of diffuse and future interests?4
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 has suffered court-imposed
limits—stricter construction of commonality and the “add-on”
requirements of superiority and manageability. State courts have followed
suit. Class actions are intended to allow diffuse interests unable to bring
suit individually to vindicate their rights in a single and efficiently
1. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
2. See Brennan Center for Justice, Fact Sheets on Legal Service Corporation
Restrictions (2000–2001), available at http://www.brennancenter.org (last visited Feb. 1,
2003).
3. See Robert C. Fellmeth, No Class, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 17, 1996, at 7.
4. See, for example, the litigation model utilized by plaintiff attorneys
challenging tobacco on an addiction theory nationally in Castano v. American Tobacco
Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
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prosecuted action. But because these interests have no other alternative,
a court decision to decertify a class eliminates the case. Ironically, where
separate cases can and will be brought individually in large numbers, the
class is more likely to win certification. Courts have betrayed the class
action purpose by eliminating the very cases most needing class format
so a wrong (often a massive one) can reach our courts. One strategy,
perhaps related to forming a corporation to finance such actions noted
above, could be to respond to decertification by filing hundreds or even
thousands of individual actions. How likely are judges to deny
certification if the alternative is piecemeal, repetitive, and wasteful
litigation visited upon them?
Another alternative would be to use a modified version of California’s
Unfair Competition Act5 as a legislative model for the other forty-nine
states. This statute provides for a private attorney general action on
behalf of the general public.6 Three modifications to this concept
(notice, adequacy of representation, and hearing on final judgment) could
avoid the Federal Rule 23 barriers noted above and satisfy due process to
give it collateral estoppel impact.7
Some have advocated broader use of law enforcement remedies, such
as public prosecutor enforcement.8
(2) Reverse standing and immunity limitations, which may be
accomplished by statute. Such barriers to justice include the Allison
problem, 9 police practice limitations, 1996 court stripping statutes,10 and
Supreme Court decisions expanding state immunity.11
(3) Facilitate access by awarding prevailing plaintiffs attorneys’ fees.
Many states have private attorney general attorney fees by court
decision, statute, or both.12 The Alyeska Pipeline case precludes private
5. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (2002).
6. See Robert C. Fellmeth, Unfair Competition Act Enforcement by Agencies,
Prosecutors, and Private Litigants: Who’s On First?, 15 CAL. REG. L. REP. 1 (1995).
7. Id. at 8.
8. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 387 (West 1999).
9. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 1998).
10. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2255
(2000); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and
18 U.S.C.); Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
11. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
12. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1977); see also CAL. CIV.
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attorney general fees federally, although numerous specific statutes
award fees to prevailing plaintiffs, and some circuits allow a percentage
of a benefit to be awarded to mass tort or other common fund counsel.13
What should the highest priority be to stimulate representation of general
and future interests at the state level?
(4) Reduce attorney costs to facilitate access. Why not create a class
of practitioner—the independent legal technician—to provide noncomplex
legal services (for example, those consisting primarily of the completion
and filing of forms) to those below the wealthy class, at $20 per hour
rather than $200 per hour? Such persons could be examined and
licensed in narrow areas of high demand (for example, landlord-tenant,
immigration, family law), restricted to practice in that area, and required
to take periodic re-examinations in that area. Such a system would
assure competence more assiduously than do state bars, which do little to
assure competence in actual areas of practice.
(5) Reduce court costs and delay. Would it help if civil litigators were
not steeped in a “hired gun” mentality? Should litigators be paid by
courts and given bonuses where they help the court find the truth? What
other methods are available to elevate the officer of the court function
and lessen the commonly dishonest and obstructionist hired gun
approach?
Should the fast track experiment now under way in many jurisdictions
be made mandatory and general?
Do we need more courts? How many, and how do we get them?
Can we streamline litigation by expanding summary judgment,
attorney sanctions for abuse, attorney discipline applied to big firm civil
discovery, and other abuses? What new ideas do we have?
(6) Impede the trend toward privatization of adjudications. Should
mandatory arbitration or mediation be opposed or bent in a fairer
direction? How? What can we do about the inclusion of these clauses in
employment contracts?14

PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West Supp. 2002).
13. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); see
also Lealao v. Beneficial Cal., Inc. 82 Cal. App. 4th 19, 26–31 (2000) (summarizing
current federal and state law and related history).
14. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Brief of Amici
Curiae Public Citizen, Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (No.
99-1235); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES, POSITION PAPER:
REASONS TO OPPOSE PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN CONSUMER CONTRACTS
(2000) (on file with author).
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III. COURT SECRECY
Many regulatory failures, including those portending irreparable harm,
are revealed through private litigation. The Firestone tire tread example
is one of many private personal injury suits to do so, and consumer law
cases abound to remedy abuses that should have been addressed by
responsible regulators. But confidentiality agreements muzzle plaintiffs
and inhibit public protection, additional deterrent-producing suits, and
preventive regulatory action. The publicly funded courts are used by
plaintiffs to obtain money damages, which are increased on condition
that the abuse is not shared to create additional liability for the
defendant. Both parties gain at the expense of those not at the table.
Clearly, the option of secrecy and muzzling should be taken off the table
so that it cannot be part of the bargaining process. How do we
accomplish that? Are there legitimate areas of confidentiality?15
IV. COURT BIAS
The 2000 Bush v. Gore16 decision amplified what most of us already
know: courts are biased. Not a little, but a lot. The almost infinite
rationalizing power of the human mind allows personal and political bias
to guide decisions far more certainly than any notion of fair or consistent
application of legislative intent. To be sure, absolute objectivity is
impossible. But judges should strive toward a higher degree of
objectivity than was exhibited in Bush v. Gore, where five U.S. Supreme
Court justices suddenly discovered an activist view of the Equal
Protection Clause they had previously been unable to find in a thousand
cases. What can we do to lead jurists to apply the law in a more
principled, consistent fashion?
The manner and terms of judicial appointment, election, and retention
can create or reinforce bias. Campaign contributions in judicial
elections are a particularly pernicious form of influence by those who
give and expect an advantage in court. Texas and some other states
allow campaign contributions. Other states require judges to mount
substantial campaigns to remain in office. In Los Angeles it costs a
sitting judge, where challenged, at least $80,000 just to appear in the
15. See Alan B. Morrison, Protective Orders, Plaintiffs, Defendants and the Public
Interest in Disclosure; Where Does the Balance Lie?, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 109 (1989).
16. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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necessary official voter pamphlet.17
Bias turns strongly along empathy lines. In whose shoes does the
court stand? Accepting the notion that some bias is unavoidable, how
can we promote the appointment and retention of persons who identify
with future and diffuse interests and those of the dispossessed?
V. PUBLIC EDUCATION AND TOOLS
The media largely sets the table for public policy alteration,
particularly for those lacking campaign contribution influence. How do
we reach the media with these issues to facilitate our priority goals? For
example, press story selection criteria favor coverage of seemingly
absurd personal injury cases (a lawsuit by a burglar against his victim,
harm from hot coffee, and so forth). On the other hand, the Firestone18
case coverage has raised court secrecy issues and amplified serious
regulatory deficiencies. How do we more systematically stimulate
visibility for access, secrecy, and bias issues—particularly when the
harm is general, prospective, or not amenable to the typical journalistic
handles of celebrity, violence, sex, or irony (boy bites dog)?
* * * * *
VI. BACKGROUND ON PANELISTS
Robert Fellmeth is the holder of the Price Chair in Public Interest Law
at the University of San Diego School of Law. He is founder and
executive director of USD’s Center for Public Interest Law and the
Children’s Advocacy Institute.
A graduate of Stanford University and Harvard Law School, Fellmeth
was one of the original Nader’s Raiders, organizing the student groups in
1968 and directing the Nader Congress Project in 1970–72. As a deputy
district attorney and assistant U.S. attorney in San Diego from 1973–81,
he litigated twenty-two antitrust actions and founded the nation’s first
antitrust unit in a district attorney’s office.
After forming the Center for Public Interest Law in 1980, he litigated
many cases enforcing California’s public records, open meetings law,
and other sunshine statutes, as well as cases relevant to consumer
protection, political reform, and, since 1990, children’s rights.
17. See Kaplan v. Los Angeles County, 894 F.2d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 1990); see
also Public Citizen Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Pub. Citizen v.
Bomer, 274 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-51009), at http://www.citizen.org/printarticle.
cfm?ID=658; Public Citizen Brief for Appellants, Pub. Citizen v. Bomer, 274 F.3d 212
(5th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-51009), at http://www.citizen.org/print_article.cfm?ID=6285.
18. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
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He currently chairs the board of directors of Public Citizen
Foundation, is a member of the board of the National Association of
Counsel for Children, and is counsel to the board of the National
Association of Child Advocates. He has served on the board of directors
of Consumers Union and California Common Cause.
He has taught at the National Judicial College, the National College
of District Attorneys, and the California Judicial College. He has
authored or co-authored fourteen books or treatises, including The
Nader Report on the Federal Trade Commission;19 The Politics of
Land;20 California Administrative and Antitrust Law: Regulation of
Business, Trades and Professions;21 and California White Collar
Crime.22 He is currently writing Child Rights and Remedies,23 a text
on the rights of children.
Alan Morrison co-founded the Public Citizen Litigation Group, the
nation’s preeminent public interest law firm based in Washington, D.C.
Litigation Group attorneys bring precedent setting lawsuits on behalf of
citizens to protect health, safety, and rights of consumers.
He has handled a broad range of litigation including leading
consumer, ethics, and Freedom of Information Act24 cases. Morrison
has trained public interest attorneys for U.S. Supreme Court practice and
assisted them in their case preparation across a wide range of issues,
from civil rights to the current challenge of the Texas judicial election
process for alleged campaign finance abuse.
Morrison currently serves as an adjunct professor at the New York
University School of Law and is immediate past president of the
American Academy of Appellate Lawyers. He served for nine years as a
member of the Board of Governors of the District of Columbia Bar. He
is also a member of the National Academy of Sciences’ Program on
Science, Technology and Law.
He also served as an assistant U.S. attorney for the Southern District
19. EDWARD F. COX, ROBERT C. FELLMETH & JOHN E. SCHULZ, ‘THE NADER
REPORT’ ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969).
20. ROBERT C. FELLMETH, POLITICS OF LAND (1973).
21. ROBERT C. FELLMETH & RALPH H. FOLSOM, CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE AND
ANTITRUST LAW: REGULATION OF BUSINESS, TRADES AND PROFESSIONS (1991).
22. THOMAS A. PAPAGEORGE & ROBERT C. FELLMETH, CALIFORNIA WHITE COLLAR
CRIME: CRIMINAL SANCTIONS AND CIVIL REMEDIES (1995).
23. ROBERT C. FELLMETH, CHILD RIGHTS & REMEDIES: HOW THE U.S. LEGAL
SYSTEM AFFECTS CHILDREN (2002).
24. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
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of New York from 1968–72; visiting professor at Harvard Law School;
adjunct professor at Tulane University and Stanford University; guest
lecturer at Fudan University, Shanghai, China; and Wallace Fujiyama
visiting professor at Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii.
He taught as a visiting professor at Stanford Law School during the
2001–02 academic year.
Theodore M. Shaw has litigated civil rights cases throughout the
country on the trial and appellate levels and in the U.S. Supreme Court
and has worked internationally on a broad range of discrimination
issues. Arguing for the Legal Defense Fund, Shaw recently led the
battle at the United States Supreme Court on behalf of parents and the
Kansas City school district in the long running school desegregation
case, Missouri v. Jenkins.25
In 1989 Shaw was a fellow in the Twenty-First Century Trust’s
Seminar on Global Interdependence, and in 1991 he was a participant in
the Salzburg Seminar on American Law. In 1993 he participated in a
conference on affirmative action in post-apartheid South Africa in East
London, South Africa. In 1994 he addressed and consulted with the
Senate Judiciary Committee of the Spanish Parliament and a select
group of Spanish judges in Madrid, Spain, on the subject of the
American jury system as Spain considered implementation of a jury
system for civil trials. In 1998 he was part of the National Employment
Association Delegation attending joint symposia in Tokyo and Osaka.
In 1994, 1995, and 1999 Shaw led delegations of Legal Defense Fund
lawyers to South Africa where they conducted seminars for the Black
Lawyers’ Association on constitutional litigation.
Shaw is a member of the bar in New York and California and is
admitted to practice before the U.S. District Courts for the Central and
Northern Districts of California; the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits; and the U.S.
Supreme Court. He is also an adjunct professor at Columbia Law
School and currently serves on the Advisory Board of the European
Roma Rights Council in Budapest, Hungary. He is vice chair of the
Board of Trustees of Wesleyan University and is a board member of the
Greater Brownsville Youth Council, the Poverty and Race Research
Action Council, FairTest, and the Archbishop’s Leadership Project.
Nadine Strossen has written, lectured, and practiced extensively in the
areas of constitutional law, civil liberties, and international human rights.
In 1991 she was elected president of the ACLU, the first woman to head
the nation’s largest and oldest civil liberties organization. Because the
ACLU presidency is nonpaid, Strossen continues in her faculty position
25.
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as a professor of law at New York Law School.
Since becoming ACLU president, Strossen has made more than 200
public presentations per year before diverse audiences, including
approximately 500 campuses, and in many foreign countries. She
comments frequently on legal issues in the national media and has been
a monthly columnist for the online publications, Intellectual Capital and
The Position.26
Strossen has more than 250 published works including her book,
Defending Pornography: Free Speech, Sex, and the Fight for Women’s
Rights,27 which was named by the New York Times a “Notable Book” of
1995 and was republished in 2000 by NYU Press. Her co-authored
book, Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex: Hate Speech, Civil Rights, and
Civil Liberties,28 was named an “Outstanding Book” by the Gustavus
Myers Center for the Study of Human Rights in North America.
The National Law Journal has twice named Strossen one of “The 100
Most Influential Lawyers in America.” She graduated phi beta kappa
from Harvard College and magna cum laude from Harvard Law School,
where she was an editor of the Harvard Law Review.
Patricia Sturdevant has specialized in consumer protection for more
than two decades, both in legal services programs and later in a public
interest private practice in which she emphasized complex and class
action litigation challenging unlawful, unfair, and deceptive business
practices.
A graduate of the University of California at Los Angeles School of
Law, Sturdevant is a past president of the San Francisco Women
Lawyers’ Alliance and recipient of the President’s Pro Bono Service
Award from the State Bar of California for District Four, Vern
Countryman Award, and William F. Willier Award from the National
Consumer Law Center.
Sturdevant is co-founder of the National Association of Consumer
Advocates (NACA), a nationwide association of more than 600
attorneys and consumer advocates who have a wide range of experience
curbing abusive and predatory business practices and promoting justice
26. See generally The Position, at http://www.theposition.com (last visited Feb. 1,
2003).
27. NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE
FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS (1995).
28. HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., ANTHONY P. GRIFFIN, DONALD E. LIVELY, ROBERT C.
POST, WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, & NADINE STROSSEN, SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF
SEX: HATE SPEECH, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1994).
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for consumers. NACA’s key issues include: sale of defective vehicles
(lemons), home equity scams, unlawful and abusive practices in the
extension of credit, unfair and abusive debt collection practices, and
unfair credit reporting practices.
VII. PANEL DISCUSSION29
ROBERT FELLMETH:
I’ll be moderating a panel this morning on court strategy, process
changes that could better ensure that underrepresented voices are heard
by our courts. We know that courts are increasingly devoted to
resolving disputes among the wealthy. The average citizen faces
diminished access to public courts as tort reform and corporate defenses
limit the right to hold defendants accountable. Problems faced by less
powerful and unorganized interests often include undue cost and delay,
settlement secrecy, tort reform limitations and impediments to mass tort
remedies, the growing use of the mandatory arbitration clauses, and
court favoritism for the powerful.
Hopefully, we will be able to discuss some of the problems in the current
status of the law on these questions, and some potential solutions. Recent
cases, including some in the last several weeks, impact our subject. We will
have some questions right after the break, with Dave Vladeck screening them.
We have quite an array of distinguished panelists in this Summit, and
this Session is no exception. We’re going to be talking about access,
standing, cost of delay, and court bias.
I want to begin by noting that there has been a recent case, Legal
Services Corp. v. Velazquez,30 on the issue of legal services. As you know,
the LSC has been restricted statutorily by Congress in the representation
of clients beyond the individual who might come into the office.31 Under
the Reagan administration, hostility toward class actions and systemic
lawsuits that would resolve a dispute en masse was transcendent. That is
an issue important to court access. If the poor cannot get access to the
courts through an efficient mechanism, then we have a problem.
I wanted to begin with Ted and ask him about that issue, that problem,
and whether or not the case resolves it.
29. This Part has been edited to remove the minor cadences of speech that appear
awkward in writing and to identify significant sources when first referred to by the
speakers.
30. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
31. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, § 504(a)(16),
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 132 (prohibiting LSC funding of any organization that
represented clients in an effort to amend or otherwise challenge existing welfare law).
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TED SHAW:
Good morning. I first want to note that for those of you who are not
familiar with this, the Legal Defense Fund is a separate institution from
the NAACP. It was once part of it, but there is often confusion, so I
don’t want to sit here and have people think that I represent the NAACP.
We were founded by the NAACP, but we are entirely separate.
Turning to the question that was put to me, the Velazquez case was a
case in which the Supreme Court decided that a congressional limitation
on a legal service attorney’s ability to make certain kinds of arguments
and to bring class action cases was unconstitutional.32 It was a decision
that was somewhat heartening, but I don’t think it solves the problem.
For some time now, there has been a concerted attempt by those in
Congress, who really want to make sure that a certain agenda doesn’t go
forward, to limit the ability of legal services lawyers to pursue class
action cases and other kinds of cases. The Court was primarily
concerned with the First Amendment implications of these limitations,
and the First Amendment issues had to do with the fact that the legal
services attorneys could not make arguments on behalf of private
individuals they represented and could not make the full range of
arguments that the courts ought to hear in order to resolve an issue.33
The attorneys were put in a position where they either had to make a
choice of withdrawing from the litigation or abandoning certain,
possibly critical, arguments. That also raised certain considerations
relevant to the ethical duties of lawyers, both to the courts and to clients.
It is unlikely that Congress is finished with these issues. The
dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia is unsettling, but not surprising.
Justice Scalia says “so what” to all of the problems raised by the
majority. He contends that this is merely a decision by the Congress not
to fund certain kinds of activities. To his thinking, it is not a problem.34
And in fact, as I was coming out here on the plane and reading the
excerpt from the opinion again, I just had to share with you this one line
that is stunning, but, as I said, not surprising. It says that it may well be
that the bar (of § 504(a)(16)) will cause LSC funded attorneys to decline

32. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 537–38.
33. Among these restrictions, legal services attorneys are presumably barred from
challenging the constitutionality of Congressional enactments—raising a rather serious
separation of powers issue in limiting judicial review.
34. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 549–50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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or withdraw from cases involving statutory validity.35 But that means
that fewer statutory challenges to welfare laws will be presented to the
courts because of the unavailability of free legal services for that
purpose. Scalia contends: so what? He argues that the same result
would ensue from excluding LSC funded lawyers from welfare litigation
entirely.36 So his point was that the Congress could say no welfare
litigation by LSC lawyers or legal services lawyers, period, and that
would be okay. And that is a suggestion. And if the conservatives in
Congress are so inclined to do so, they could come back and do exactly
that. It is certainly advice to conservatives.
There are a lot of discussions that go on in Supreme Court decisions,
sometimes between the Justices, sometimes between the Justices and
another branch of government, and sometimes between Justices and other
people who are out there involved in these issues. So I’m not sure that I
would feel all that sanguine about this being a resolved issue, because this
is all about the ability of legal services lawyers to contest the
constitutionality or legality of actions affecting welfare services and the
impoverished. So Congress, having enacted welfare reform, and feeling
punitive towards poor people, has also tried to limit their ability to contest
welfare reform and delivery, and they’re not going to give up on this.
NADINE STROSSEN:
I’d like to comment on that. I think that the Velazquez case was a
welcome victory, but a very narrow one in two senses. Narrow, first, in
that the rationale that the too slim majority used was itself a very narrow
one, as Ted has indicated. But secondly, the massive attack and cutback
on legal services that Congress passed in 1996 was accomplished by the
time Velazquez reached the Supreme Court. The ACLU, along with the
Brennan Center for Justice, had brought a broad-based attack on all of
the cutbacks on legal services. All but one of these challenges were
rejected by the lower courts. So the Supreme Court did not even have a
chance to strike down the many other restrictions, starting with funding
slashes. And the Congress enacted a limit on the kinds of clients that
could be represented by legal services. I want to emphasize that all of
this is still “good law,” neither reviewed nor struck down by the
Supreme Court.
For example, legal services may not represent any “aliens”—that was
the term used in the statute—or prisoners.37 These are people whose
35. Id. at 556 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
36. Id.
37. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, § 504(a)(11),
(a)(15), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321.
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rights are very much embattled, who are often impecunious and in need
of representation. Second, there was an absolute prohibition on certain
cases being brought. Again, the Velazquez case couldn’t touch this. For
example, no cases involving abortion, no cases involving redistricting
for voting, no cases involving prisons—again, major areas where there
are civil liberties violations. Legal services attorneys are incapacitated.
Furthermore, there is a limit on the activities that legal services lawyers
can undertake. For example, legal services lawyers may not lobby, even
though this would be a very cost effective way to protect the rights of
their clients. Nor can they communicate with legislators to oppose laws
that are cutting back rights and access to justice.
There are also limits on the kinds of claims that can be made and the
litigation methods that can be invoked, not only in the specific context of
welfare legislation. The cutback in 1996 prohibited any use of the class
action device whatsoever and also prohibited any challenge to the
constitutionality of any statute, not only the welfare statute that was
specifically involved in the Velazquez case. It also prohibited victorious
legal services lawyers from seeking attorneys’ fees. So this was a huge,
devastating, wholesale cutback.
Aside from the one narrow provision that went to the Supreme Court,
only a small portion of the statute—the across-the-board prohibition on
challenging statutes—had been rejected by the courts. The Second
Circuit decision that did go to the Supreme Court in Velazquez had
rejected the facial challenge that should be brought to all these other
aspects. However, they remain open to bringing an as-applied
challenge. I spoke to the ACLU’s legal director who had litigated a
companion case in the Ninth Circuit, and he said that, given the lower
court rulings, the odds of successfully challenging some of the other
prohibitions on an as applied basis would be slim.
To put all of this devastating attack in even broader context, it was
fought in a situation in Congress where there was a serious effort to defund legal services altogether, not just make it fade out of existence, but go
the whole hog. And Ted, that is taking the argument of Scalia’s dissent
one step further, that Congress doesn’t have to fund legal services at all.
And it was very painful for us to watch the legal services lawyers
themselves (the LSC) decide what is the lesser of two evils. Do we go
along with all of these restrictions, because that is the price we pay for legal
services continuing to exist at all, or do we go to the mat fighting these
restrictions, realizing that we may end up with no legal services program?
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ROBERT FELLMETH:
Well, I guess the key question then is, what do we do about it? We
have Velazquez sitting there, which gives us a sliver of a victory. Here is
a question for the panel to consider: is it worth going back up with an asapplied challenge—given some scintilla of hope from Velazquez which
might influence some of the circuits? Is it worth going to the Congress?
Is it worth trying to run around it? In terms of class actions, you can try
filing sequential cases and move for consolidation, you can try all sorts
of contrivances, perhaps mandamus, if you can get away with it under
the restrictions. What is the best approach to take here? Do you create a
§ 501(c)(4), as some have done, separate from the legal services and
then fund litigation from there? What is the best approach to take here?
Any comments?
ALAN MORRISON:
No more court challenge. Put your tail between your legs.
something else for the time being. You’ve got to be realistic.

Do

ROBERT FELLMETH:
You don’t think it would be worthwhile?
ALAN MORRISON:
I don’t say never, but I would not spend a lot of time looking for an
as-applied challenge. Beside the fact that you probably cannot win it,
even if you do win it, it is going to be as applied, which is very narrow,
even narrower than the Velazquez opinion. I am not a legal services
lawyer, so it is a question of how to allocate our resources. If I were a
legal services lawyer and a particular case came along, I might feel
differently about it, although they probably cannot bring their own cases
to challenge constitutionality even as applied, because that would violate
another part of the law.
ROBERT FELLMETH:
What about state funded legal services?
PAT STURDEVANT:
I was going to say something different. I think that the best hope for
success, particularly in the representation of consumers, is a privatepublic partnership. What we have seen in the National Association of
Consumer Advocates is an influx of attorneys who used to be with legal
services programs and who are now going into private practice. They
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remain motivated by public interest goals. Historically, there may have
been some distrust of private lawyers, but they are doing very good work
all across the country. Not only are public-private partnerships
important but also the kind of joint venturing and cooperative efforts that
we saw on a very broad scale in Castano.38 Those things are happening
all across the country.
For example, a number of attorneys in the South and in Minnesota and
in New York have combined together to challenge the practice of
mortgage lenders giving kickbacks to mortgage brokers for bringing in
borrowers at interest rates, higher than those for which they would
otherwise qualify. This is called yield spread premiums. So if you
would qualify for a seven percent mortgage, but they bring you in at
eight percent, they get a kickback; and the consumer unknowingly pays
that increased mortgage over the thirty-year life of the mortgage. This
costs consumers $14 billion a year as a nationwide practice. But it is
being challenged by a consortium of individuals. I think that is a
hopeful mechanism for proceeding in the future.
TED SHAW:
Bob, I wanted to take issue with Alan’s “no more court cases”
comment. I’m not sure how absolute you want to be about that. I agree
generally with the sentiment that we do not want to look to the courts,
and certainly not to the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary
generally, for expansiveness to restore the ability of poor people or
minorities or other people to win protection. On the other hand, where
you have real clients, real life wrongs, you have got to go to court.
Lawyers are faced with the choices of when to go to court, when not to
go to court, and that is something they have to discuss with clients. It is
a very thorny set of issues, and I, for one, would be the first one to say
that we have to be very strategic about it. More specifically, within the
boundaries of what Velazquez allowed, which is narrow, as Nadine has
pointed out, I think that there is some room to litigate the kinds of cases
that were opened up or saved by Velazquez. But when it comes to
reestablishing more protection for legal services lawyers and their
clients, I do not see the courts as a big avenue for that. I do not see the
38. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (involving the
collaboration of hundreds of personal injury and consumer attorneys in numerous states
challenging the tobacco industry nationally for unfair competition in marketing a
manipulated addictive product).
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legislative fix as being in the cards either, without a change in Congress.
So I think it is just trench warfare. You have got to slug it out and make
choices on a day-to-day basis in consultation with clients.
NADINE STROSSEN:
Ted, I am not quite as pessimistic about the legislative fix, because I
think this was rammed through Congress with a lot of disinformation out
there. For example, that so-called bastion of the so-called liberal media,
the Washington Post, had an editorial opining that the restrictions were
not tragic, because the ACLU can pick up the cases that legal services
cannot handle. And I think there was just a tremendous amount of
ignorance about the under-resourced nature of my organization and
others, and of our ability to pick up the slack for this kind of litigation.
Second, we have done extensive polling on people’s attitudes toward
the death penalty. It shows that even among people who strongly
support it, they are enormously concerned—not so much about the race
discrimination, not so much about the geographic disparity or lack of
access to DNA evidence—but about inadequate representation. They
feel that you have got to have a good lawyer. Now, obviously, in that
situation we are talking about death, but I think we can make a case that
when you are talking about people seeking subsistence welfare, when
you are talking about people who are seeking political asylum (to use
some examples of the types of cases that legal services can no longer
handle) these are matters that are tantamount to life and death. I think
there is a great opportunity to make a case of fundamental fairness. So I
would like to try to make that case a lot more concertedly than it was
made last time around.
ROBERT FELLMETH:
Should we do it on a state level and build up to the Congress?
Because we have an opportunity in many states to make a case and to
provide legal services without necessarily invoking these federal
restrictions, is that a viable option?
TED SHAW:
The climate varies state to state. I don’t know that there is one answer
to that. But I can think about one example, Texas, where the IOLTA
fund (the fund generated from the interest on attorney trust funds) has
been restricted so that it cannot be used. It cannot be used to support any
class action litigation or, actually, any public interest litigation. So some
of the same spirit that animates federal policies is also at work in some
of the states. That is not to say that we should not continue to try to
open up those opportunities or reverse those policies, but I am saying
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that we have to face the fact that this is a phenomenon that is not limited
to the federal level.
ROBERT FELLMETH:
For those of you who are not familiar with it, the IOLTA funding
relates to attorneys’ trust funds. The interest from those trust funds generally
goes into an account that is then spent on legal services for the poor by
the bars in the various states and in varying arrangements. In addition to
the issue that Ted raised, there is the issue of a challenge to IOLTA
funding itself, based on the “paycheck protection” concept, the concept
that really you cannot take this money without the permission of the
clients, because it is the clients’ property. That whole battle is being fought
in some of the states right now. So that money may be vulnerable.
But I think what we are concluding here is that we have a very
difficult landscape of multiple challenges and multiple opportunities,
possibly navigable by some litigation challenges and some legislative
challenge at the state level. As Nadine points out, there may even be an
opportunity in the Congress, because the Congress today certainly is not
as reactionary as the Congress that enacted this particular provision. It is
a rather extreme set of provisions.
I am thinking that we may also want to consider another aspect. What
about the fiduciary duty of an attorney to the attorney’s client, to the
client group, which we have a tradition of honoring and respecting in
this country going back to cases like Cox v. Delmas39 in the 1890s,
where the court noted that: “The relationship between attorney and client
is a fiduciary relation of the very highest character . . . .”?40 To what
extent are you intruding in that fiduciary duty by telling an attorney you
cannot go to this other forum and help your client out, you cannot say
this, you cannot seek that remedy, and you cannot challenge
unconstitutional statutes or acts? I think that kind of attack might be
more helpful than a First Amendment attack—which is maybe
somewhat limited in the terms of its scope, as Velazquez indicates.
NADINE STROSSEN:
That is an interesting idea, Bob. You might find some surprising
allies on the Supreme Court. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist has
39.
40.

33 P. 836 (Cal. 1893).
Id. at 839.
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been very firm in his defense of the independence of the judiciary. He’s
a very staunch supporter of an independent bar and an independent
judiciary, so that might be the kind of appeal that he would find
persuasive.
ROBERT FELLMETH:
That could be a critical vote. I wanted to mention also with regard to
Pat’s comments that her alternative remedy is an important one to keep
in mind, because if you are blocked in terms of public money and legal
services money, you might need that option of the public-private
partnership. She mentioned Castano,41 and for those of you who don’t
know what that involves (I think there’s a Castano attorney here)
Castano is a consortium of hundreds of attorneys who got together
nationally to take on tobacco. It was an extraordinary event in American
legal history. Tobacco had won 800 straight individual personal injury
and product liability cases. A group of attorneys got together and said:
“That’s it, we’re taking them on. They have a lot of attorneys, we’ll
have a lot of attorneys.” Each law firm involved committed $100,000
and together devoted hundreds of attorneys. They were able to certify a
national class action lawsuit and took tobacco on. The defense began to
cave in a bit with the Liggett settlement.42 Then Castano was decertified
by the Fifth Circuit because of some of the class action problems we will
discuss in a moment.43 But the Castano attorneys stuck together and
filed state class actions in twenty states, kept the pressure on, and,
substantially because of their efforts, we have a tobacco settlement. The
point is, they got together and created a kind of a partnership, if you will,
among themselves, to create a massive law firm. Now, I do not know
how you facilitate that in general. If we give them enough attorneys’
fees, that might help. Maybe Pat has some ideas.
PAT STURDEVANT:
Yes. I wanted to mention another example, because that bit of
litigation is probably beyond the means of all but a very small
percentage of the attorneys in the country. But there have emerged other
public-private partnerships that are effective. One excellent example of
that is the work done by my friend and colleague, Bill Brennan, who is
at the Atlanta Legal Services Home Defense Project, and for years he
has been a proponent of working together with private lawyers. He has a
41. Castano, 84 F.3d at 734.
42. See Attorneys General Settlement Agreement, available at http://stic.neu.edu/settle
ment/LIGGETTSETTLE.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
43. Castano, 84 F.3d at 752.
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staff of people who are inundated with foreclosure defense cases because
of the emergence of predatory mortgage lending practices. He has
developed a technique of identifying the issues, identifying the clients
who are capable of being class representatives, referring these cases to
private lawyers, and then working with them during the course of the
litigation. In just one case against Fleet Financial, they galvanized the
community, civil rights, consumer groups, community groups,
legislators, and in effect drove Fleet Financial out of Georgia some
seven years ago. The result of the class action lawsuit was a settlement
in excess of $17 million which fully compensated all of the victims of
these predatory practices. In addition, through cy pres monies, they set
up the Consumer Law Center of the South, which operated for several
years; gave additional sums to local organizations that enabled them to
continue to advise victims of similar practices; and contributed a small
portion of money to the National Consumer Law Center and the
National Association of Consumer Advocates. I think that is the model
for one kind of public-private partnership that can work very effectively.
ROBERT FELLMETH:
A lot of legal services type attorneys are in a position to detect serious
violations which maybe they can not handle directly. Perhaps they can
handle them through a § 501(c)(4) adjunct not subject to federal
restrictions (which many of them have created) or through a publicprivate partnership, which Pat mentions. But let us keep in mind that
you have another barrier in front of you, the developing impediments to
class action. I want to discuss that a little bit because that ties in. It is
certainly going to be important if you remove the congressional barriers
to representation. Whether they are there or not, you still have the court
barriers to class action certification.
We have developed over the past thirty years a series of obstacles
which are replicated at the state level to the representation of people en
masse. You have the requirement that common questions predominate.
You have the requirement that the class action be a superior method of
resolving the grievance. You have the unmanageability defense. You
have the adequate representation barriers. And you have the expense of
certification.
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The courts have been increasingly hostile to class actions, particularly
to large class actions. We have a recent case, Allison,44 in the area of
civil rights, which has traditionally been one where there has been a lot
of license for class action certification. It indicates a cutting back even
there. I wonder if maybe Ted could comment a little about Allison, what
it means, and what we might do to overcome it.
TED SHAW:
Allison is a case out of the Fifth Circuit which covers Texas,
Louisiana, and Mississippi. It involved a suit against Citgo Oil
Company. It was a class action involving a range of issues from hiring
all the way through to promotion. A broad array of remedies were
sought, including back pay, front pay, injunctive relief, and damages.
The court looked at the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which was a legislative
fix to a series of decisions that the Supreme Court handed down in the
late 1980s, many of them in the 1989 term. They cut back on the ability
of plaintiffs to attack employment discrimination in a number of ways.
The Fifth Circuit effectuated a fundamental change in the case law with
respect to the ability of plaintiffs in employment cases to win class
certification. It primarily relied on the fact that damages were being
sought and that damages are very individualized. For those of you
familiar with it, a class to be certified under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3) (for damages at law) could not easily be certified.
Even a class to be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), which would ordinarily
allow injunctive relief to be sought collectively, might be problematic.
These are very complex issues. The Court said that even the systemic
injunctive or mandate change that all of the plaintiffs sought (regardless
of their individualized damages) also could not be pursued through a
class action. Given how difficult it is to litigate these cases, the
complexity of the issues, and the enormous amount of time and energy it
takes to litigate individual cases, such a bar may sound the death knell
for employment discrimination cases. It makes litigation difficult where
you have these kinds of procedural barriers.
Allison is now being followed by courts in some other circuits. We
are obviously looking at a Supreme Court opportunity to review it. So
in sum, that is what Allison is about.
It is a serious problem, and it is particularly lethal when you wed it
with some of the other attacks on court accessibility. For example, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Circuit City, which allows mandatory
arbitration to cut off the ability of employees to bring suit once they

44.
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enter into an employment contract.45 It has never been easy to litigate
Title VII cases. Now it is really up in the air as to how we can
effectively pursue relief for those who suffer employment
discrimination.
NADINE STROSSEN:
I would just like to add to what Ted has said about how the courts are
interpreting, or more accurately, misinterpreting the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in general with respect to class actions. Here too, we
face another problem, which is Congress passing laws that expressly
prohibit class actions as a method for asserting rights on behalf of
particular clients or by particular lawyers. Before, I mentioned the legal
services legislation as one example of where Congress has also
prohibited using the class action as a device to bring a constitutional
challenge to a statute that Congress passed. One recent example, I could
mention others, but let me confine myself to the badly misnamed
Immigration Reform Act that was passed a few years ago in 1996, under
which, in addition to cutting back substantively on the rights of
noncitizens, one of the other things that Congress expressly did was to
prohibit any class action to challenge the unconstitutional provisions of
that law.46
ROBERT FELLMETH:
By way of background to Ted and Nadine’s comments: You have
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3)—three
different types of class actions. Rule 23(b)(3) is the damage class action,
and that is the one where barriers have been extensively put in place by
federal courts. Class actions brought under Rules 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2)
have traditionally been civil rights injunctive relief types of actions in
equity, which have traditionally been open to suit much more readily on
a class action basis. What is important about the Allison case is the
bleeding of the Rule 23(b)(3) barriers into the Rule 23(b)(2) action. It
means that all of a sudden the barriers that have been put in the way of
the damages remedy may now be visited upon a Rule 23(b)(2) case.
This has implications in terms of Pat’s public-private partnerships.
45. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 122–24 (2001).
46. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and
18 U.S.C.).
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Guess what, it is going to be pretty difficult to get a private partnership if
you are not getting attorneys’ fees. You may not get attorneys’ fees
without damages, and you are not getting meaningful damages if the
damage class action is barred in mass cases. This is a chess game that
you have got to play very carefully.
My suggestion is, rather than presumptively turning to the class
action, we should bring mandamus actions against the relevant public
officials for abuse of discretion on behalf of the identifiable persons or
groups. The fact is, if you win a judgment under an abuse of discretion
standard of review, that decision will affect more than just your client. It
will become a de facto kind of class action without the barriers and
without the certification problems. I hope public interest attorneys go
that route more often, because I think it is open to them more than they
realize.
NADINE STROSSEN:
But isn’t the abuse of discretion standard of review an extraordinarily
high burden of proof? It certainly is for the companion procedure in
New York.
TED SHAW:
It is in federal court. As you know, mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy. But I take it, Bob, you are talking about under California law. I
know there is a counterpart in New York. I think it is viewed differently
under California law. And so what you are suggesting really pushes us
to the question of whether we should get out of federal courts in certain
kinds of actions. You have to consider the decisions like Allison and
whether there are adequate state court remedies or procedures and
statutes.
Just to be entirely clear, in the past, the employment discrimination
class actions have been bifurcated so that one could pursue the Rule 23
(b)(1) and (b)(2) issues separately if necessary, and then, if there are
individualized damage issues, they can be sorted out on an individual
basis. So what the court has done is really abandoned all of the
governing case law, which has allowed for those first stage proceedings
to go forward and eventually end up with individualized considerations.
ALAN MORRISON:
Bob, a couple of points. First, mandamus actions are principally
against government officials. Citgo, of course, is a private company.
And aside from the legal differences, there are practical differences. The
government is more likely to be bound to and obey the law than private
companies are in regard to individual actions; and with the individual
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actions, such a private firm may simply buy off an individual plaintiff.
Second, attorneys’ fees are available in a Title VII action regardless of
whether there are damages, so it is not quite a Pandora’s box on that
score.
I want to ask Ted a question. Ted, suppose that in Allison—and I do
not know if this is actually happening or not—or in another case like it,
you simply abandon your damages claim. That is, you ask for
restitution, which I take it is not yet precluded, so that you could recover
restitution damages. You only lose your other damages, and you
eliminate Seventh Amendment issues. Why don’t you comment, first,
on whether you think that would work, and second, what kind of a
conflict does that put you in with your clients, where you ask them to
choose between giving up their damages (beyond restitution) or giving
up their opportunity for class treatment?
TED SHAW:
Well, that is a wonderful question. It goes to the core of the dynamics
in employment discrimination and class action cases. You have the lead
plaintiffs (class representatives), who often have issues between
themselves and the class. One problem is the defendant’s ability to buy
off the lead plaintiff versus the lead plaintiff’s obligation to represent the
class overall. However, those issues are always there. Second, because
of the buy-off problem that you are talking about, the balance between
injunctive relief and damages is often a struggle and must be resolved
with our clients.
The scenario you are proposing raises some interesting questions, but
it puts us in an almost impossible situation because, more often than not,
given the way our legal system works in this country and the part that
money plays in it, the named plaintiffs are going to say: “We want to be
represented by somebody who is going to win damages for us.” That
can be a problem, were we to pursue injunctive relief exclusively or
where we short change the class representatives. Another thing is going
on that I want to be careful in framing. Some judges listening in may
deny this is happening, but let me tell you what it feels like to me. It
feels like the federal judiciary, dominated by very conservative judges, is
consciously attempting to cut off the ability to litigate many kinds of
civil rights cases. And if I am correct, then I suspect that some of what
we see in Allison and other cases is going to continue to be articulated
even if we do not have the damages question before us. For example, to
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the extent that one could say, well, if you look at this class, you have
people in various job classifications, categories (the teamsters issue, and
so forth). Some of these judges are simply going to try to find a way to
make class actions impossible and unpalatable. I hope I am wrong on that.
ROBERT FELLMETH:
Well, that has happened already in the consumer area, hasn’t it? Pat,
don’t we have a strong trend toward finding all sorts of distinctions
among the class in order to find a lack of requisite commonality? How
do we get around that to allow a mass suit in order to vindicate a large
scale grievance? As I mentioned in an early draft of the materials, only
half jokingly, if we went out and got all 5000 of your laborers who were
discriminated against and had them file individual actions, it would be
amazing how fast either class action certification (or consolidation)
would occur. The courts and Congress would be singing a different
tune. It is ironic, because one of the bases for a class action is that it is
not a case that can be brought otherwise and that disability forms its
raison d’etre. But in fact, that very disability is enabling the courts to
bar them and avoid adjudication altogether, because courts know that
plaintiffs do not have the resources to bring them individually. If we
could arrange the cases so that they were brought anyhow, in some other
format, it could lead to a countertrend.
On the issue of leaving out damages, restitution and damages often
merge, they are often very similar in practical application. We have a
statute in California, the Unfair Practices Act,47 which gives restitution
rather than damages. It is still very useful. And it may be time to “beard
the lion,” as it were, and to take up Alan’s suggestion. We need to
require the courts to expose their own intellectual dishonesty where they
interpose arbitrary judicial barriers to obtaining a remedy. In other
words, maybe litigation is essentially an exercise in making people
expose their unstated biases.
I wanted Pat to comment briefly about California’s Unfair Competition
Act as an option to bypass some of the problems that Alan and Ted are
talking about. Instead of facing judicial barriers, such as the alleged
commonality failure, the mantra that common questions do not
predominate, or findings that it is unmanageable or not superior as a
method, you have cause of action. It is in equity and does not afford
damages, but it does afford restitution, and it does have broad standing
and broad scope. In this state it has a private attorney general structure
which eliminates virtually all of the barriers that have been discussed.
Pat, do you want to talk about that a little bit?
47.
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PAT STURDEVANT:
Yes. This is a somewhat unusual statutory device that, if not unique,
is at least more developed in California than in other parts of the country.
This statute, codified at section 17200 of the Business and Professions
Code,48 essentially prohibits any unfair, deceptive, or unlawful practice,
so you can borrow from any other illegality in municipal ordinance, a
federal statute, a state law, civil rights, and so forth. Anything that is
prohibited by any statute, even a criminal statute, can be the basis for an
action under section 17200. It’s called a nonclass class action or a
representative action, and it has very broad coverage. It has been used in
California to challenge, for example, insurance packing by finance
companies, overcharging for interest on mortgages, overcharging for
junk fees on mortgages, sale of unusable lots on subdivisions, abusive
collection practices, mistreatment of patients in nursing homes, and
violations of mobile home park ordinances. So it is extremely broad.
ROBERT FELLMETH:
It has also be used to combat the sale of obscene literature, the sale of
endangered whale meat, and the hiring of illegal aliens.
TED SHAW:
We have used it in housing discrimination cases in California.
PAT STURDEVANT:
Yes. It is a very strong statute because it provides for a broad grant of
standing. Any individual can sue. The individual does not even have to
be aggrieved. In addition, organizational plaintiffs can sue. The
remedies that are available are also extremely effective in curbing
wrongful business practices, because you can get an injunction against
the unlawful practice, and you can get restitution to all individuals who
have lost money by reason of the practice. It is not the same as
damages, but in most consumer cases, there is a very subtle difference, if
any.
It has been used by organizations acting together with private clients.
For example, in our Badie v. Bank of America49 case, we challenged the
bank’s attempt to impose mandatory binding arbitration on its credit card
48.
49.

CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1997).
79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (1998).
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and deposit account customers and were successful in the court of
appeal. The advantages are that you do not need to certify a class, you
save time in litigation, you save expensive notice, and you can get
effectively the same result.
In many states there are similar statutes, called UDAP laws. In the
District of Columbia50 we were recently successful in passing a statute
modeled on the California act which goes even further.51 It has the same
broad grant of standing, but it expands on the remedies available, so that
in addition to injunctive relief and restitution, you can get damages of
$1500 per instance or treble damages, whichever is greater, and punitive
damages. But even in the states that do not have that expansive grant of
standing and those expansive remedies, their UDAP statutes provide for
injunctive relief that can be used as an alternative.
But I also do not think, Bob, that we have seen the same cutbacks in
certification of consumer class actions as in other areas—possibly
because in consumer transactions you are dealing with standardized
form contracts, which are contracts of adhesion, and are used in virtually
all transactions.
ROBERT FELLMETH:
I think we probably see it on the product liability side more than on
the typical consumer law case.
PAT STURDEVANT:
Yes. On the consumer side it is easier to get a class certified because
the practices are typical and tend to treat all of the victims in the same
way.
ALAN MORRISON:
There is one exception, of course, to getting classes certified in federal
court, and that is if the defendant wants them certified. Usually the
defendant wants them certified where it has a pigeon for a plaintiff and
they are ready to buy off the plaintiff class lawyers. We have spent a
good deal of our efforts over the last five years fighting these class
action settlements where the principal beneficiaries are the lawyers and
occasionally the class representatives and, of course, the defendants.
The Supreme Court in the Amchem case52 and also with Fibreboard53 set
some ground rules in these kinds of cases.
50.
51.
52.
53.
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One interesting question is whether a case like Allison will be
followed. In a Fifth Circuit case involving a similar situation, the court
simply sent it back without even bothering to quote Allison, because it
was so clearly wrong. Rather, the court cited Fibreboard. The federal
courts (and some state courts) may be willing to certify cases, as long as
they can get rid of the case and the defendant wants to dispose of it as
well. But where some class members have viable claims and want to
certify a class and defendants object and the case is not viable without
certification and hence will go away, certification is more problematic.
So it is clearly a one-way street in our view.
ROBERT FELLMETH:
So you are concerned about the possibility of the defendant selecting
the suitor? Is that it?
ALAN MORRISON:
They do not have to select the suitor, it is kind of an arranged
marriage. They know who the cooperative lawyers are, and they bring
the lawsuits, and the judges know who they are. We have had terrible
problems with this.
ROBERT FELLMETH:
What is the solution to that?
ALAN MORRISON:
We have managed to anger our private partners in these lawsuits by
coming in and objecting; pointing out that fees have been excessive,
which does not make us any more popular. But we’ve got to use Rule
23(e) to protect the class members if the courts and the parties will not
do it. The courts of appeals are better, and the Supreme Court is better
still, when they have been willing to step in. But one of the things that
we have seen (and the reason I asked Ted this question) is that
defendants and plaintiffs—partly in order to avoid the possibility of
plaintiffs opting out of the class—have been recharacterizing cases as
injunctive when they were originally brought as damages cases. It
becomes an injunctive case when that becomes the way to settle it
without the opt-out problem. So that battle is still going on. I am not
referring to cases where there are genuine issues about injunctive relief,
but where that relief is disingenuous. For example, where plaintiffs

141

PRINTERCOURT STRATEGY.DOC

1/15/2020 3:54 PM

order the defendant to stop doing that which the defendant has already
stopped doing anyway. In one Texas case, the plant had closed down.
The judgment ordered the defendant “not to reopen” the plant. It is
bogus.
NADINE STROSSEN:
That is a good segue way to my remarks, because in a lot of our cases
injunctive and declaratory relief are really the heart of what we seek. So
for all practical purposes, it does not matter as much whether the class is
certified or not. Obviously, that is true in a situation where we are
facially challenging a statute, as we did last week to the latest federal
Internet censorship law. But it is also important in work where we are
protecting the rights of individuals against governmental abuses. A
major example recently has been our work on racial profiling and other
police abuses and, in particular, racial discrimination throughout the
criminal justice system. We now have pending about a couple of dozen
of these cases. We seek class certification in all of them, and it has really
been hit or miss as to which classes are certified and which are not.
By the way, I asked our legal director, not knowing to what extent you
were joking, about filing a lot of individual lawsuits. His response was
that in the cases we deal with, if the class is not certified, we could not
even bring an individual action. And if the ACLU does not have the
resources to do that, as a relatively large organization, who would?
What we do, of course, is hope that even in an individual action we have
a sufficiently sympathetic client or group of clients. Last week, for
example, we filed against the police department in Cincinnati where our
clients represent many individuals joined together as the Black Citizens’
Coalition. Their individual affidavits are just riveting and are getting a
great deal of media attention, a great deal of political attention; and, of
course, our aspiration is that their individual claims are sympathetic
enough so that the threat of damages awarded to them will be enough to
prompt governmental reform or that the favorable press coverage will be
sufficient to bring about pressure on the agency to change.
ROBERT FELLMETH:
That is interesting.
ALAN MORRISON:
I think it is really important when people are bringing these lawsuits to
ask the question: do you need a class action? Can you bring a
mandamus action; can you bring some other kind of an action? And if
so, what kind of a class action will really achieve your goals? This, of
course, gets you to the tension between your institutional goals and the
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goals of the individual client, with the very difficult ethical problems
that you face. But you also have to tell your clients: “Look, in theory
you would like money damages; we would like to get you money
damages, but the question is: What kind of a half loaf can we do?” This
question really becomes important in the context of class actions. It may
also be important in legal services cases, because in some of them you
can actually litigate them as test cases—without litigating them as class
actions.
TED SHAW:
I started out as a Justice Department lawyer many, many years ago.
And the Justice Department lawyers at the time focused on injunctive
relief. I recall that some years later I moved out to California for a few
years and opened up the West Coast office of the Legal Defense Fund,
and one of the first cases that we litigated was a housing discrimination
case. We were dealing with an ex-Justice Department lawyer, somebody
I knew, whom we were going to litigate with as co-counsel. We had
tension with them about the issue of damages or whether we would be
seeking primarily injunctive relief. These kinds of discussions are very
common. But as time went on, I came to believe in and to see very
clearly how important it is to seek damages, even in cases where we
were pursuing injunctive relief. If there is one thing that people who are
in business understand, it is money. If you want to dissuade them from
acting in a discriminatory manner, I think that you have to make them
think about monetary exposure. I have come to believe deeply in that.
With injunctive relief, slap them on the hand and make them change
their ways, abide by the law, and so forth. But that is not enough of a
disincentive, at least in discrimination cases.
So what you are talking about is real in terms of these tensions. And it
plays out, once we file the cases. When you have the named
representative saying: “I want a million dollars” (everybody thinks one
million is a nice round figure, right?); and then you have to say: “Well,
we represent the class as a whole.” Is that possible in terms of injunctive
relief, and so forth? All those issues are there. But I want injunctive
relief on behalf of the client, and I also understand why institutionally
we want to pursue damages. And I understand why, if they have been
subjected to horrendous practices, why they also want damages. That is
the way America works, whether we like it or not.
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ROBERT FELLMETH:
Well, there are a number of options here to consider. One is, take the
Unfair Competition Act concept of a private attorney general remedy in
equity, expanding the notion of restitution (maybe applying it more
readily) or perhaps expanding it through civil penalty assessment.
Again, it could be a remedy in equity that might not invoke the same
kind of class action barriers that we are seeing with Rule 23(b)(3)
damage class actions. There are some options that might loophole, or at
least leave behind, the large reservoir of debilitating case law that is an
obstacle to us in pursuing a case on a class basis. Those options may
range from going to the public prosecutor and getting him or her to take
the case to trying to enact an adjusted unfair competition type of statute.
Any thoughts on what options might be advisable or politically
opportune?
ALAN MORRISON:
I would not go to the U.S. Justice Department right now.
ROBERT FELLMETH:
Good advice from Alan. What about the related problems we have
with the “court stripping” statutes, the state immunity decisions that
have been hampering us, even if we do get a class certified or we do not
have a class problem? Or, if we go by way of mandamus against the
government official, but, all of a sudden, the state is immune. These
cases are amazing to me. We have these reconstruction statutes intended
to punish Southern states for their post-Civil War regression, and, all of
a sudden, these same laws are interpreted to immunize the very targets
of the (then) Congress. I don’t understand it. Nadine, I would like to
hear your thoughts on that.
NADINE STROSSEN:
Bob has raised the issue of judicially created obstacles to access to the
courts. Even if you get into the courts, obstacles to meaningful remedies
still exist. Certainly, the judge-created immunity doctrines have been a
major obstacle to success in addressing the police misconduct problem.
And I agree with Ted that it is not only private business but also
municipalities and governmental agencies that are not going to take your
claims as seriously (nor will they take their legal obligations as
seriously) if you do not have the clout of money damages behind you.
In addition to those judge created doctrines that are barring meaningful
relief, we are now seeing a sustained and unusually successful barrage of
legislation from Congress, and it is being replicated at the state level. In
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many states across the country, legislation purports to expressly deny
power to the federal courts to review whole categories of disfavored
claims. This, of course, has been part of the battle throughout American
history. Every time the courts have issued an unpopular decision, we
have a flurry of legislative proposals to deny the federal courts power to
do everything from desegregate the schools to enforce reproductive
freedom and separation of church and state. What has happened recently
though is that these laws have passed. A whole series of them passed in
1996 amidst almost no political debate and almost no press or media
attention. They are usually slipped through as last minute amendments
to gigantic appropriations bills. This is one area where reporting and
getting the public concerned has been a major strategy in terms of
legislative reform. The ACLU issued a report in 1996 about some of
these court stripping bills.54
Let me follow up on the actual adverse impact of these lesser known
laws. I have already mentioned one of them—the law that greatly
reduced the ability of legal services lawyers to pursue a whole slew of
important kinds of cases. Another was the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA)55 which makes it extremely difficult to protect the constitutional
rights of an increasingly large proportion of Americans (in particular,
African American men) who are incarcerated in this country. Even if
you can show constitutional violations, you are denied attorneys’ fees
that you used to be able to get. You are also denied special masters,
which you used to be able to get.
Consent decrees are prohibited, and a major way of winning these
cases politically as well as economically had been through the
negotiation of such decrees.
Consent decrees that exist now
automatically expire after two years, and any of you who have done
institutional reform litigation know that often nothing has changed in
54. See American Civil Liberties Union, Court Stripping: Congress’ Campaign to
Undermine the Power of the Judiciary, an ACLU Special Report (June 1996), available at
http://www.aclu.org/library/ctstrip.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2003). The ACLU has
published an updated report on this problem, which was exacerbated by the USA
PATRIOT Act, antiterrorism legislation enacted in October 2001. USA PATRIOT Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.,
15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C., 50 U.S.C.); see also
Ronald Weich, American Civil Liberties Union, Upsetting Checks and Balances:
Congressional Hostility Toward the Courts in Times of Crisis (October 2001), available at
http://www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID=9810&c=111 (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
55. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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two years. Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court last year issued a
decision in an ACLU case, in which it narrowly rejected a separation of
powers constitutional attack on this law.56 We all know that the Court is
very faithful to preserving its own power and the power of other federal
courts in certain situations. It did not care that much that the power of
federal courts to enforce constitutional rights on behalf of incarcerated
people was slashed.
Another example is the grotesquely but accurately named
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.57 This statute cut back
habeas corpus relief even further than the courts had already
accomplished. Again, even when individuals on death row have
constitutionally meritorious claims, the federal courts are incapacitated
from reviewing them. The U.S. Supreme Court has started to hear some
of the constitutional challenges to that law, but, not surprisingly, we do
not have as good a record as we would like.
And the last example is an immigration reform act that again denies
complete access, not only to the federal courts, but even to
administrative courts within the INS, for very important claims under
international and domestic law.58 For example, those who are fleeing
persecution can be turned away from our borders by, in effect, a police
officer of the INS without even an opportunity for an administrative
review, let alone federal court review. The Supreme Court is going to be
hearing two constitutional challenges to aspects of that litigation.59
So if all of that is not bad enough, it is just the tip of the iceberg.
Congress has been holding hearings for the last few years on what it
calls “judicial activism.” These laws are part of a sustained assault on
the power of the federal courts to enforce constitutional rights. They
started with those who are the least powerful and the least popular in our
society: the poor, the immigrants, the prisoners, and those on death row,
but the principles, or lack of principles if you will, that are getting these
laws passed and getting the Supreme Court to uphold them, would
sustain denial of access to the courts to anybody with any constitutional
claim.

56. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
57. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2255
(2000).
58. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and
18 U.S.C.).
59. The Supreme Court upheld the ACLU’s challenges to these provisions in both
cases. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2002); Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348
(2001).
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ROBERT FELLMETH:
Well, Nadine, that is one of the most depressing recitations I have
heard in a long time.
NADINE STROSSEN:
It is supposed to energize people. We have got so much good work to do.
TED SHAW:
I would like to add to our depression, but I hope also to our energy,
because I refuse to give up or give in. I think it is very important,
because we get to these sessions, and we can talk about what is going on,
but once the other side knows that people are despondent or in despair,
they have won. And I refuse to give in. But we have to lay out the
picture and see what the reality is. I agree with all that Nadine has just
recited, but let me just round the picture out a little bit and talk about
access to the courts when it comes to police misconduct or to systemic
reform of police departments. There was a case that the U.S. Supreme
Court decided some years ago, back in the 1980s called City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons.60 This was a case that involved the chokehold that
police used to subdue people who they had stopped and detained. It was
used disproportionately on minorities. At the time the chief of the police
department responded to a series of incidents in which AfricanAmerican males were stopped and choked (resulting in deaths and
serious injuries) with the observation that there might be something
physiologically different about African Americans—that the carotid
veins in their necks, or something like that, allegedly made them more
susceptible to injury than Caucasians. This was Darryl Gates, whom
you may remember. And I am not making this up. In any event, the
underlying case went to the Supreme Court, a challenge brought on
behalf of an African-American who was stopped, detained, and held in a
chokehold. The Supreme Court found that he did not have standing (nor
would any other individual like him have standing) to challenge the
practices of the police department, including the use of a chokehold,
unless they could show that they were very likely to be subjected to the
same conduct individually. In other words, I would have to show that I
am going to be stopped and choked, which of course I cannot show.
60.

461 U.S. 95 (1983).
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ALAN MORRISON:
What about damages? Have you tried for damages in these chokehold
cases yet?
TED SHAW:
I don’t remember how that issue fell out offhand. But it is possible to
seek damages.
ALAN MORRISON:
Aside from the official immunity they would have.
TED SHAW:
I don’t know what happened in that particular case, but obviously you
can pursue damages in an individual case. But what I am talking about
is systemic reform. For example, it was just announced in the
newspaper as I was leaving New York that Abner Louima—you
remember, the man sodomized with a broom handle, in a horrific
incident at the seventieth precinct in New York—is settling with the city
for millions of dollars. But he has given up whatever pressure his
lawsuit might bring for systemic change within the police department.
Now, when you lay this on top of the Amadou Diallo killing and
Patrick Dorismond—I do not want to focus too much on New York, but
I think you all know these stories. At the end of the Clinton
administration, civil rights groups were urging the Justice Department,
the Attorney General, not to give up, to do something about pursuing
systemic reform through litigation in New York City. And it didn’t
happen. I think this was a major failure on the part of the Clinton Justice
Department. They went out of office without filing a suit. They were
trying to negotiate with the current Mayor of New York, and I am sure
he was buying time. But the bottom line is, it did not happen. If the
Justice Department—which has the ability to seek this kind of systemic
reform—does not do so, private citizens simply cannot do it.
Now, let me just end this dialogue, or diatribe, by saying that those of
us who litigate civil rights cases on behalf of African-Americans or
Latinos are seeing so-called reverse discrimination cases where standing
principles, which have been tightened up for us in our cases and raised
as barriers, have been loosened for those so-called reverse discrimination
cases. Causes of actions that did not even exist before are now allowed,
and standing principles that had constricted for us have been loosened.
One of my former colleagues (who happens to be White) is Pam Karlin,
who teaches up at Stanford Law School. She calls it the Universal

148

PRINTERCOURT STRATEGY.DOC

[VOL. 40: 115, 2003]

1/15/2020 3:54 PM

Court Strategy
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

White People Standing Rule. Hence, in Shaw v. Reno,61 we have the
redistricting cases challenging the creation of congressional districts that
allow opportunities for African American and Latinos to elect
representatives of choice. These cases on behalf of white voters are
going forward, even where you do not have the traditional vote
dilution—the predicate for showing that there was an injury in cases that
we would bring. Now, White plaintiffs can bring these so-called reverse
discrimination cases, and we are about to have a whole new round of
litigation after the upcoming postcensus redistricting. I hope you are
getting the picture. I think that standing principles are being used in an
unprincipled way, in a way that is biased against civil rights litigation, in
particular on behalf of racial minorities.
ALAN MORRISON:
Actually, there is another principle you forgot, that you have standing
to lose. In Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group
Inc.,62 we had standing to get into court, and then we lost the victory we
won in the lower court.63 It also happened in Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.;64 it is the same
principle—you have standing to lose.65
ROBERT FELLMETH:
I want to point out that there is a distinction between the cases that
Nadine and Ted are talking about and the cases that Pat is talking about
in the consumer law area. In the cases that Nadine is talking about, you
really have to rely on the courts as a check. You cannot rely as much on
political institutions, which may be a little friendlier to consumer
interests. Not always, but sometimes. But it is consistently hard to get a
jury, much less a legislature, to identify with someone on death row. So
you have an important need for access to the courts; they are really your
last resort. You are not going to do very well in any other forum when
you are representing the people that Nadine is talking about.
So you need that unbiased court which we are going to be talking
about after the break, and we are going to be talking about access to it.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

509 U.S. 630 (1993).
438 U.S. 59 (1978).
Id. at 72, 82.
429 U.S. 252 (1977).
Id. at 261–62, 270–71.
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But it seems to me that the standing and access is critical. We have not
even talked about cost yet; I think we will talk about that after the break
as well. But I do want to end this little discussion right here and have
you think about the standing problem we have been discussing. We
have the Unfair Competition Act model; it is directed at private action.
Can that model be adapted to the kinds of cases we are talking about
here, even though you might take a hit on damages? I am simply
suggesting that there may be some remedies available to us that might
surmount the barriers that Ted is talking about. Every time you require
the power elite to shift, you expose its bias toward stasis and status quo
protection. That is, of course, what it may be all about in the final
analysis. But there is some stated principle that we must be consistent.
And it is difficult to be consistent and not expose your bias or your
racism if you have to continually shift ground and contradict yourself.
As we think about solutions, let’s take a ten-minute break and then get
back to the issues of cost, access, standing, and strategies.
[Break]
ROBERT FELLMETH:
What I propose to do is to talk about one other aspect of barriers to
access that we have not talked about, the privatization issue, and then to
go to opportunities we might entertain to overcome some of the barriers
we have been discussing, including the class action obstacles, legal
service type barriers, court costs and delay barriers, as well as the issue
of incompetence of counsel, which Nadine alluded to, in the
representation of folks who are in desperate straits.
The privatization issue is so important because of the trend of the
law—the tendency toward more and more adhesive contracts (whether it
be on the labor side, the consumer side, or the financial side), to include
provisions which deprive many of access to the courts. These adhesive
contracts confine the resolution of a suit to a one-on-one arbitration or
mediation process, which might cost money and which is often stacked
against the consumer. Increasingly, the courts uphold such remedies,
perhaps due to the tension of their own workload. I would like some
discussion first from Alan and then Pat about the danger of privatization
and what it means in terms of access.
ALAN MORRISON:
I do not think I need to tell anybody in this room what it means to be
forced to give up your right to go to court due to an arbitration agreement.
In some situations, arbitration is perfectly fair and reasonable, and, if that is
so, then consumers and employees may be expected to agree to them. But
when they are not fair and reasonable, should people be forced into them?
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I think that the Supreme Court’s decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams66 is probably the worst of their arbitration cases because it was
unnecessary, and it completely misreads the statutory language and
history. It assumes that Congress created a scheme to exclude from
arbitration contracts a tiny slice of the economic world (interstate
transportation workers). Leaving aside the details, these interstate folks
were the only people Congress thought it could constitutionally cover in
1925 when enacting the Federal Arbitration Act.67 The Court held that
this narrow-focused Congress intended to subject every employee in the
United States who had any connection to commerce to the Arbitration
Act. To say that this is an outcome determined result is the mildest of
understatements.
I think the decision is terrible for workers, but it is also terrible for
consumers for one reason: if this case had gone the way it should have
gone, the Congress would have acted to change the statute to include
employees in general. But as the price of bringing virtually all
employees in, they would have included elements of essential fairness,
because the burden would have been the other way around. Now the
burden is completely shifted, and the victims of the Arbitration Act have
to muster up enough votes (including enough votes to override what will
probably be a presidential veto) to do anything about this. So I consider
this to be one of the worst arbitration cases to come along, if not the
worst. Certainly, it has been a real disaster for the public. It is another
one of these five-to-four decisions, with the five people in the majority
those we expect to be there.
Senator Sessions, who is not normally thought of as being on the
consumer side, introduced a bill last year with a number of features that
would have helped out and made arbitrations less unfair. It did not go
all the way, as many people hoped it would. Now the question is
whether he will even be interested in continuing with that activity,
because part of the impetus was the arbitration of employment disputes,
which are now clearly on the other side. So it is a very bad
development, and it could be fixed legislatively, except for one problem:
the people who want to fix it do not have control of either House of
Congress or the White House. Other than that, it is a cinch.

66.
67.

532 U.S. 105 (2001).
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2000).
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ROBERT FELLMETH:
Pat, I would like you to comment, and then I will go to Nadine for
some opportunities so we can get optimistic.
PAT STURDEVANT:
I would like to comment because I think this is a pernicious threat to
our system of justice and it is not something that has come about by
accident. There has been a real move by financial institutions to adopt
arbitration clauses as a way of enhancing their bottom line. They have
set up a particular provider, the National Arbitration Forum, which
advertises its services in a way that no court could ever do. It says:
“Bring your cases to us, and you can be sure there will be no class
actions,” which arbitrations circumvent. So it has been adopted, and it is
being followed as a way of giving industries a leg up to prevent
consumers from getting access to injunctive relief, to punitive damages,
and to class certification.
But we are going to have to make that record in order to change the
Federal Arbitration Act so that it excludes consumer and employer
disputes. So far, there has been an adoption by the highest court that
arbitration is a benign alternate forum—without understanding what
happens in it. I do not think it can be fixed. I do not think it is going to
help, for example, to provide some discovery or to let the institution bear
the cost or make them follow the law, because the intent and the design
was to set up an unfair process. We do have the recently issued Rand
Study which dispels the myth that arbitration is faster and cheaper.68 But
we have to show where arbitration is excessively costly, where the result
is unfair or unjust. And it is possible to do. For example, it has been
done in sex discrimination cases. We have to do it, and then and only
then will we be able to make a persuasive case that the statute needs to
be changed to allow consumers and employees their right to court.
ROBERT FELLMETH:
We need the case studies that the personal injury attorneys specialize
in so well, the actual “horribles” in terms of what happens.
PAT STURDEVANT:
We have to have that, because otherwise the discussion is all in the
abstract. Proponents of arbitration contend that it is just an alternate
68. DEBORAH R. HENSLER, RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS ACTION
DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (1999), available at
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR969.1/MR969.1.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
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forum, that you can obtain the same remedies; but, I think as a factual
matter that is not the case, but that is yet to be demonstrated.
ROBERT FELLMETH:
Essentially, we have arbitrators who depend upon the graces of one
side, the side giving them repeat business, and that is not the consumer.
PAT STURDEVANT:
That’s right. Another thing I think we can do is have our members
seek to be arbitrators. If you apply to the AAA, for example, which is
considered to be neutral and unbiased, you will find that in order to be
appointed as an arbitrator, you have to be recommended by existing
arbitrators. You have to agree to follow the principles of the arbitration
association, to promote the association, to adopt its point of view. It is
just apparent on the papers that what they are looking for is not a neutral
person, but somebody who is already on the side of industry. But in
light of the two recent Supreme Court rulings, that is the case that we
have to make in order to obtain reform.
ROBERT FELLMETH:
Looking at all these barriers, we also must consider the critical issue
of cost. Most citizens cannot afford a lawyer to provide access to the
court in the first place. What do we do in terms of opportunities? What
do we do to take the offensive—which is the theme for this conference?
What strategies should we undertake? We have already discussed the
Unfair Competition Act and its replication in other states, perhaps with
some adjustments, but what else? What else is available to us on the
political side, the legal side, or the court side that might allow us to turn
the corner here and begin to unravel some of these problems? Nadine,
do you have any thoughts?
NADINE STROSSEN:
Well, I want to correct any misimpression that we should be
depressed. I think that by definition, many people here are public
interest lawyers. You should feel thrilled about how important you are
and how necessary you are. In all seriousness, a lot of the problems we
talked about can be addressed by lawyers taking cases individually,
either cases that would contribute toward bringing about system wide
reform or individual cases on their own terms. So where we cannot
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bring class actions, we will bring these cases one by one. And at least in
the area of civil rights, attorneys’ fees are generally available—not only
at the federal level but also at the state level. We have also been
lobbying, in those states where attorneys’ fees are not yet recoverable for
successful civil rights plaintiffs, to enact fee recovery provisions.
The only area where we faced cutbacks in attorneys’ fees for
prevailing plaintiffs, the only one that targeted such fees, is the PLRA,
the Prison Litigation Reform Act.69 It did create a monetary disincentive
to bring those cases, and that has importance, but only in a defined range
of cases. So the ACLU will continue to fill that void through our
National Prison Project. But as far as the rest of our docket is
concerned, prevailing plaintiffs generally can recover attorneys’ fees.
So yes, this is an advertisement for you to join forces with us to right
some of these injustices.
ROBERT FELLMETH:
In our Session here, we have two aspects which interact on taking the
offensive. One is court secrecy, because we may be helped to the extent
that what happens in court is public. To the extent that we represent
democratic forces, it helps to have the judges operating in the public
domain. And we should consider the related issue of court bias. Judicial
bias underlies a lot of the problems that we have been discussing. How
do we stimulate courts that are neutral and manifest an obligation to the
general public, to the future, to the law, and to consistency?
I want us to talk a little bit about secrecy, because I think it is an
important aspect of our taking the offensive. We are not going to be
able to take the offensive if we are dealing with a system that is
operating in secret. Nadine, you have the ultimate example of secrecy
that you might share with everybody.
NADINE STROSSEN:
I had the opportunity to discuss this with one Supreme Court Justice
who had read a newspaper story about this a couple years ago and said:
“This cannot be true; this cannot be happening in the United States.” It
is in fact true, but is not as well known as it should be. As a result of the
anti-immigration and so-called antiterrorism laws that were passed in
1996, additional power was given to the INS to detain (the euphemism
for imprison) individuals who are suspected of being terrorists. It does
not matter if they are lawful residents, it does not matter how long they
have lived in this country or what their ties are. Many of them have
69.
(2000).
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children who were born in this country. They may not only be
imprisoned indefinitely, but they may be held on secret evidence; that is,
evidence that is classified to such an extent that it is not even revealed to
their lawyer. And in some cases, even the judge is shown only a
summary of this evidence in camera. There are approximately two
dozen individuals who have been held in prison in this country on such
so-called secret evidence. We have had mixed results in the courts in
challenging this law. Right now, a bipartisan piece of legislation is
pending in Congress. Again, once you get it out to the public and to
politicians that this is going on in the United States, you find very
conservative members of Congress, as well as liberal ones, saying that it
is just plain unfair. And I would segue back to my original point: I think
that a lot of these injustices are so blatant that if the public reacts and the
media exposes it, a number of politicians (including some who might
surprise you) will jump on board to support legislative fixes.
ROBERT FELLMETH:
That’s interesting. Your description of secret tribunals rather sounds
like Amnesty International describing Iraq. Alan, what about secrecy in
general, beyond the extreme cases Nadine is talking about. For example,
we have the use of courts to secretly settle cases, the Firestone case
being settled quietly and so forth. That is an access issue that is not
discussed very often. What are your thoughts about that?
ALAN MORRISON:
There are some different issues relevant to secrecy we need to keep
straight. One has to do with the secrecy about the amount that the
defendant is paying the plaintiff. That is always interesting, but, in my
judgment, is not the ultimate issue in the case that we really ought to be
fighting about. Second is this issue of whether things can be kept secret
in cases while the case is going on. And third, what happens when the
case is over, typically without a trial being held, so that there is no public
event at which this information is revealed? What happens to the data
then?
There are two sets of concerns. One is data sharing among lawyers,
and we have seen positive developments in the last half a dozen or so
years, particularly in product liability cases. For example, tobacco cases,
breast implants, and others where courts have been insisting upon
centralized data banks where all the depositions and all the documents
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are being placed, with essentially no restrictions on them. They are not
requiring the plaintiffs to reinvent the wheel and redo all the discovery,
with the defendants hiding what they said in the early depositions. That
is a positive development.
But a lot of cases do not rise to the level of mass torts, at least not at
the beginning. Take Firestone for example; a plaintiff’s lawyer with
whom we have dealt for many years and have high regard for told me he
was placed in the incredibly difficult position of representing a client
whom he was told would get a huge amount of money from the
defendant on one condition, that all the documents relating to the unsafe
Bridgestone-Firestone tires would be kept secret. As a result, hundreds,
thousands of people may have died. The lawyer is put in a terrible
position. But he could not spread it out in the public record and put it in
the newspapers. He was forbidden from even telling the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration that he had the data and the
other evidence or that the defendant had it and all they had to do was go
ask for it. It seems to me that when we are talking about crucial health
and safety data with a product that is still on the market, there can be no
justification whatsoever for the level of secrecy that we are now seeing.
I understand that California has a bill and that they are working on this
issue now. It is something that we have just got to pay attention to,
because I do not think most people are aware of the level of secrecy and
the kind of information that is being affected. You hear all this nonsense
about trade secrets; well, everything is a secret as far as the industry is
concerned. And there may be some legitimate trade secrets, but the
number of trade secrets, legitimate or even quasi-legitimate, as
compared to the amount of secrecy, is de minimis.
This is an area where we have really got to keep on the offensive, and
Firestone is a great example of it. But it is true in many other areas as
well. This happened for years in asbestos cases. It did not happen in
tobacco cases because the defendants kept all this evidence from the
plaintiffs by making bogus claims of attorney-client privilege and work
product, but rather because they ran all their medical research through
their law firms. That is another story. But this is an area where we can
and should be on the offensive. It is going to be very difficult for
legislators to explain to anybody how information that potentially will
save the lives of people in the United States ought to be kept secret even
from the regulators who have the authority to decide if these products
stay on the market.70

70. See Alan B. Morrison, The Secrecy Scandal, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 14, 2002, at
E7 (commenting on secrecy agreements in priest sexual abuse cases).
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ROBERT FELLMETH:
I think legislators can see that you have got a nonzero sum game
where you have got the defendant and the plaintiff and you have got the
conflict of interest. The plaintiff wants the money, and the defendant
does not want any other cases, so they have an interest in common to
keep it secret and to pay an additional sum for that secrecy. The only
way to solve the problem, it seems to me, is that you have got to take
that off the table. You take it off the table by a statutory prohibition.
You just cannot do it. The information is going to be public or can be
made public, and you cannot prohibit it, and any such agreement is void,
with proper safeguards for protective orders and so forth.
I drafted a statute four years ago that would do that, and Governor
Wilson vetoed it. Fortunately, the author was Bill Lockyer, whom you
heard from last night, and who is sponsoring another bill this year to do
the same thing. So, hopefully, we will get it. Hopefully, it will happen
in other states as well.
I also want to talk about another place to take the offensive: who is
sitting on the bench and how do they operate? As we can see, the courts
are often a last resort. In some of our cases, we cannot win politically.
We are really relying on the protective offices of the court. We have a
court vacancy likely to come up in the Supreme Court, two perhaps, in
the very near future.
We have important issues at the local level regarding the campaign
financing of judges who are elected or re-elected and where the court has
become highly politicized. People appearing before the courts can be
very involved in the campaign of the judge. Alan knows a lot about this
because he has filed a case in Texas, and he is also interested in the
courts and the whole ABA issue with Bush. I would like to hear Alan’s
thoughts on court bias and how we can influence the courts to make
them more independent, as an oasis, if you will, of objectivity and
consistency.
ALAN MORRISON:
Maybe we should talk about these issues one at a time. We will talk
first about judicial elections and what they mean. Texas used to have a
law under which there were no—I say zero—limits on the amount of
money that could be contributed to campaigns for judges who were
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running for election. In 1995 they changed the law. Now, individuals
are limited to $5000.71 That is five times the amount of money that
you are allowed to give a candidate for President of the United States.
If you are a lawyer, your law firm can give $30,000; and if you are a
political action committee, you can give $300,000 to the judge.72 The
judge is specifically authorized by an exception, found virtually only in
Texas, to the Code of Judicial Conduct to personally solicit money
from anybody they want, including litigants or lawyers in cases before
them. This is the capstone of it all. I could give $5000, and my client
could give $5000, to a judge where we have a case pending, and the
judge does not have to recuse him or herself. Now, this is a law that
nobody outside of Texas believes when I tell them about it. They think
I have made this up. And yet that is the law in Texas, and the Texas
Supreme Court has held that giving such money does not constitute a
basis for recusal.
So we brought an action in the federal court in Austin on behalf of
Public Citizen and some legal services lawyers and other lawyers who
do employment discrimination cases and who don’t give money to
judges.73 Public Citizen doesn’t give money to judges. We are a
corporation, and corporations and unions are not permitted to give; but,
of course, their executives can give as much as they want, as can a trade
association. Well, the judge threw us out on two grounds.74 The first
ground was we had to go to the state courts to litigate this, although that
is clearly an exercise in futility. And the second basis was that it was a
political question. This means that no court, including the Supreme
Court of the United States, could ever entertain a due process
challenge—even one coming from the state court where we had been
told to go. So we filed our brief; if you are interested, the case is in the
materials. The case is ready for screening; it will be argued in the Fifth
Circuit probably sometime this summer.75 We are hoping to get rid of
this law—this nonlaw is what it is—and the relief we have asked for is
simply to declare it unconstitutional and to tell the legislature they have
got to do something better. Whatever the right answer is, this is not it.
But I think this gets to more fundamental questions of what we do
about judicial elections. How are they supposed to be financed? Are
they supposed to be privately financed? Should we have public
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
grounds
2002).
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financing for them, even if we do not have it for anyone else? What are
judicial elections supposed to be about?
I’m sure Nadine has seen these cases come up where the courts and
the bar associations are saying: “You cannot ask anybody anything that
anybody would conceivably want to know about a candidate,” so you
might as well be shooting dice in deciding who you are going to elect.
Anyway, I think it is an issue with which we need to come to grips. The
wonderful idea that we should not have tyrants on the bench runs up
against the ideal that if we do not want tyrants, how are we going to
figure out who these people are? How are we going to get them off the
bench, and how are we going to prevent voters from campaigning
against judicial officers who are doing what Justice Bird did here (in
California) or Justice White did in Tennessee—taking principled
positions against unprincipled laws.76
NADINE STROSSEN:
What I am going to say now is not an official ACLU policy. We do
not have one on this issue. But personally and as a civil libertarian, I am
very concerned about the double bind confronting judges running for
election. They are, or can be, attacked on their records, including very
distorted versions of their decisions, and yet they are gagged from any
meaningful response. That obviously raises enormous free speech problems,
as well as problems for democracy. If there is any rationale for electing
judges, it is to facilitate free and full debate about their powers and how
they exercise those powers, but then we do not allow that free and full
debate. So my personal position is very much against the election of
judges. I think we lose a lot more than we gain through that process.
Over history, we have seen the role that nonelected federal judges
have consistently played in enforcing the rights of minorities, whether
they be racial minorities or political minorities. I am certainly not here
to say that the federal courts are perfect; far from it. But at least
structurally, removing their selection somewhat from the political
process is a good thing. Part of the problem with what is happening to
the federal bench is that the appointment process is moving closer
toward an electoral model that breaks down that division.
76. On June 27, 2002, the Supreme Court ruled five to four in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), that state rules that forbid candidates for
elected judicial office from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues
that might come before them if elected to the bench violate the First Amendment.
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I have to interpose one dissenting viewpoint from one of my
colleagues at the ACLU. As I say, I am speaking as an individual. The
head of our Washington, D.C. office, who happens to be an AfricanAmerican woman and who has relatives who have been elected to the
judiciary in Maryland, says that elections in certain communities, and at
certain points in our history, have been an opportunity for minorities
who have not been appointed by the President or designated by their
senators to gain access to the bench. So I think she has a good
argument, but I think mine is better.
ROBERT FELLMETH:
Well, I would like to hear some questions from Dave, if you want to
come up here.
DAVID VLADECK:
The intellectual firepower of this panel has sparked far more questions
than we are going to have chance to get to this morning. So I urge you,
at the break, to find a panelist and pursue your question if it does not get
asked.
Early in the panel, Nadine used the term “under-resourced” to describe
the resources of the ACLU, and Pat talked about forging public and
private partnerships. Those two comments spawned quite a number of
questions that I think I can combine into two related questions.
Do you agree with the proposition that our side is under-resourced?
Charlie Halpern did a study in the early 1970s on the number of public
interest lawyers in the United States; I think his total was about 600. I
am not sure we have gained in size since then. Pat had suggested that
organizations like ours try to form partnerships with the private sector.
And the question really is: what are the limits on those combinations?
One question posits concern, for example, that private lawyers in police
misconduct cases might be more interested in maximizing the plaintiff’s
recovery than in long term injunctive relief. Is that kind of trade-off
something that is inherent when you engage in a sort of public-private
partnership in case representation? And this really is a question
addressed to all panelists; I don’t know who wants to take the first crack.
PAT STURDEVANT:
Let me start, David. I think there is no question but that we are under
represented. Any time we take on a battle against entrenched interests,
we are always outgunned and out manned, and I use that term advisedly.
So our weapons are that truth is on our side, justice is on our side, and
the media may be on our side—to the extent we can bring them there. I
think it is extremely important that we reach out to members of the
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private bar. There always is tension over objectives—going back to
Ted’s example of when he was in a prosecutorial office with emphasis
on injunctive relief and not damages. But if you discuss those things in
the beginning and work out the terms of representation, you can
surmount that difficulty. There are a number of examples, particularly
in the consumer context, where, on state issues or on national issues, a
consortium of individuals can get relief, whereas one attorney or one
public interest organization would be powerless acting alone.
NADINE STROSSEN:
I would like to echo Pat’s point. Although we are often described as
the largest law firm in the country, it is mostly because of our
volunteers. The ACLU is the ultimate partnership of the type Pat
referred to—where nonpaid, nonsalaried members and lawyers are
volunteers. We have about 100 underpaid staff lawyers, but at any given
moment we also have thousands of completely unpaid lawyers who are
in the private sector. I am a complete volunteer; there are a number of
others in the audience I have met today who are either with law firms or
law faculties or corporations, who are generously donating their time
and their firm’s time and resources to help us process these cases.
Having said that, it is never nearly enough. For example, we have had
many complaints over racial profiling—partly because we have placed
ads publicly encouraging people who have been the victims of racial
profiling in the criminal justice system to call an 800 number. We have
advertised in minority publications, media, and neighborhoods. Our
phones are ringing off the hook all over the country. We find it hard
even to process all of the complaints, let alone to pursue them.
You cannot individually litigate all these cases. That is why you have
to look for legislative reforms as well. And on the positive side of alternative
strategies, again using racial profiling as an example, we have found an
amazing number of police departments that voluntarily approach us in
light of the adverse publicity about this problem. They ask us to help
with training and resources. Now even that is something that takes
resources. Again, the generosity of lawyers who are not working for the
ACLU has made a tremendous difference, but never enough.
TED SHAW:
Let me say a few words in addition to what Nadine just said. One of
the disadvantages is that even in getting our stories told, there is a slant
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in the media and, of course, from the conservatives. They complain
about an alleged liberal media slant all the time. But if, for example,
Clinton Bolick (who many of you may know with the conservative
organization Center for Individual Rights in Washington), wants to get a
piece in the Wall Street Journal op ed page to attack a nominee under a
Democratic administration—let’s say for Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights—a wild hypothetical—he almost has carte blanche. Forget
the almost, he has carte blanche to the Wall Street Journal’s editorial
page, or op ed pages.
And the Wall Street Journal’s editorial pages do not even make a
pretense of being objective or balanced in any way. The same thing is
true of the Washington Times, and I could go on and on. If you think
about the papers and you ask about what national newspapers can
counterbalance that, people would think about the New York Times and
the Washington Post. But those are not newspapers that have the same
kind of slant to provide an even balance. I mean, if we want to get
something on the op ed pages of the Washington Post or the New York
Times, it is a fight. Sometimes it happens, sometimes it does not. But
you will find Ward Connolly with his piece in the New York Times op ed
pages just as likely as you will find ours. So I am saying it is uneven.
There is Fox News, if any of you are cable junkies, and Fox News
Television any time you turn it on. There is a constant diatribe against
anything that is viewed as liberal. You get the point. It is a fight. Then
there are the foundations. Foundations do not like to support litigation;
they think it is contentious.
ALAN MORRISON:
A four-letter word.
TED SHAW:
That’s right. And I always say: “Contentious as compared to what?”
Compared to Bosnia or Rwanda? We resolve a lot of the most
contentious issues in this country through our judicial system. So
compared to what? Is it really all that terrible compared to the
alternatives? But they do not like funding lawyers, and when it comes to
our work, they do not like race issues either. So funding lawyers who
litigate on race issues is almost a nonstarter. We have a few foundations
that have stayed with us, but foundations are always looking for the next
exciting thing and to move on beyond these issues that they think are old
and intractable. Frankly, the people who have the big money tend to be
more conservative. We need the support of many individuals with small
contributions; they add up. But if you talk about big money, it seems to
be more on the other side. I could go on and on, but you get the point.
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But nonetheless, we are powerful if we organize and if we cooperate
and if we work together. Part of what I think our side has failed to do is
to organize as effectively as the other side has organized. And then they
have stolen the pages from our play book. The Center for Individual
Rights has stolen exactly the model that the Legal Defense Fund used to
litigate impact cases over the years.
And finally, I want to say about this public-private distinction: it is
important to have that coalition. But I can tell you, for example, that the
Legal Defense Fund has litigated employment discrimination cases since
Title VII was enacted in 1964. And the way we approach those cases
may be different than an individual in a law firm. Law firms didn’t do
Title VII plaintiffs’ work until fairly recently for the most part. But now
after Texaco77 and Coca-Cola,78 they think they can make a killing in
this kind of work. But they do not bring to it the same kind of approach
or seek the same ends. It goes back to Alan’s discussion about the split
between damages and injunctive relief, with a few exceptions. They do
not bring the same perspective to it that an institution like the Legal
Defense Fund is going to bring to it. We have to be careful, because the
way the private bar may litigate those cases may have a profound impact
on the way the case law develops. It can come around to bite those of us
who are doing those cases in ways that seek to do more than open up a
new avenue for income streaming into a big law firm. Get the point? So
it is a relationship that we have to have, but it is one that we have to
think through carefully.
ALAN MORRISON:
I agree with most of what has been said. Our most successful
partnerships have been on an issue basis. For example, in the product
liability area, which is a lot of what our overall organization has been
concerned about, we have developed expertise in preemption law.
Preemption is the “get out of jail free card.” If you comply with a
minimum federal standard, state law cannot apply. In torts, banking,
labor, you name it, it is there. We do a tremendous amount of this, and
so what we have tried to do is to find cases where private attorneys are
handling cases for actual damages for personal injuries. We do not get
involved in the basic liability aspect of the case and try to prove
77.
78.

Roberts v. Texaco, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
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damages. What we try to do is either help out and take over or help with
the preemption issue.
We do that in other areas too, particularly through our Supreme Court
Assistance Project. That project helps lawyers with a variety of issues,
as well as preemption, when they are in the Supreme Court. And we
have trouble raising money from foundations. I tell the foundations,
look, you may not like litigation, but if the case is in the Supreme Court,
you cannot avoid it. And if you think your foundations are unhappy
with you, try being in situations in which you have got company
executives or law firm partners on the board of the foundation and you
are suing them or their client. That makes it even more popular. So I do
not want to be discouraging, because I think there is a role for
collaboration with the private sector, but I think we have to recognize
that there are differences between public interest institutions like ours
and private law firms.
NADINE STROSSEN:
I would like to mention one other strategy here, and I know both the
Legal Defense Fund (LDF) and the ACLU have used it, and that is what
I think of as creative coalition building. For example, in the University
of Michigan affirmative action suit,79 I thought it was just brilliant that
LDF and ACLU became part of a coalition of civil rights organizations
that are supporting the affirmative action program. But at least as
influential, and probably in some circles more influential, are the friend
of the court briefs that have been submitted by dozens of major
corporations located in Michigan explaining why affirmative action is
absolutely essential for their economic success. So where people might
not be moved by concerns of racial justice, they may be moved by
concerns of economic well-being. We have been able to do the same
thing with some of our Internet censorship cases, combining odd allies
such as the United States Chamber of Commerce and the National
Association of Manufacturers.
DAVID VLADECK:
I would like to put together a number of questions that relate to civil
rights litigation. Neither Ted nor Nadine had a chance to comment on
the impact Circuit City is likely to have on civil rights litigation. The
question I would like to ask is: in light of Circuit City (which essentially
gives employers of nonunionized employees the ability to assert
mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts),80 given the
79.
80.
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problems that you mentioned before with class action litigation, how are
you going to be able to enforce Title VII in the courts? Related to this
query, a number of the questioners asked whether there are
administrative remedies that might be available. Are there new
arguments that might be available to you under the Court’s theories as
developed in Bush v. Gore?81 Where are you going to turn?
TED SHAW:
Let me address the Bush v. Gore thing first, because a lot of people
were trying to see a silver lining in that cloud. It is mostly cloud, and
there is a lot of rain in it. First of all, the Bush v. Gore theory is an illdefined equal protection concept. If we know anything about it, it is
probably going to be interpreted very narrowly. I think the Supreme
Court has made clear that they do not intend to open up a huge new area.
Those of us in the civil rights community do need to push. If they want
to talk about equal protection, let’s talk about equal protection. We have
been trying to talk about that for a long time, and they hardly ever want
to talk about it. So we need to push it as far and as hard as we can.
Having said that, Bush v. Gore does not have any application that I can
see to Title VII and employment.
I think the Circuit City case is a profound defeat in terms of those who
want to keep open the avenue for employment discrimination litigation
for nonunionized employees. But the good news, as we noted earlier, is
that it is statutory. It is not constitutional; it can be fixed. And we did
pass the 1991 Civil Rights Act, as I indicated earlier, under a Republican
administration. We need to see a little bit of a shift in the composition of
the House, I think. But even with this Congress closely divided, I think
it is possible to do it.
Ordinarily, the way these things work, you have to kind of wait and,
as we talked about earlier, see the horror stories. When the parade of
horror stories comes out, we will probably have to take with it a bundle
of other issues that will need some fixing before there will be enough
momentum and steam built up to address Circuit City.
But in the meantime, we will continue to file Title VII cases where we
can. Unfortunately, individuals who enter into employment relationships
now are going to face mandatory arbitration clauses. And if you are
seeking a job, you are not going to say: “Well, I really can’t take this job
81.

531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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because of the provision you have in here.” It is an unequal bargaining
position that people are in. So people are going to be hurting because of
this if there is discrimination. But I think we can go back and fix it. I do
not know about administrative remedies, at least federally. EEOC is
overburdened as it is now. It is very slow to resolve complaints before
it. Once in a while they take on some issue and deal with it effectively,
but for the most part, what they do is issue “right to sue” letters, so that
people can go into court and fend for themselves. Here, they are not
going to have that right. So I think we are just going to have to wait and
get a legislative fix on the federal level.
ALAN MORRISON:
Are they going to issue “right to arbitrate” letters? Are you going to
have to go through the EEOC, Ted, in order to arbitrate now?82
TED SHAW:
That is an interesting question. My gut reaction is no.
ALAN MORRISON:
Whatever you want to do, they won’t want you to do, right?
TED SHAW:
You can count on that.
DAVID VLADECK:
Let me ask this to all panelists. Before, you talked about some of the
difficulties with using class actions, particularly in civil rights litigation.
The class action device has recently been modified. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(f) was added to allow interlocutory appeals. There
are bills in Congress that would, in essence, federalize all class action
law by allowing virtually any state-based class action to be removed to
federal court. What do you forecast in the near future about the fate of
Rule 23? Do you think it is going to be modified significantly? The
Rules Committee again is looking at sweeping changes to Rule 23. Any
of you want to address what you think is likely to happen?
ALAN MORRISON:
I do not think the Rules Committee is going to do very much. The
proposals that are currently before them are relatively modest, and I
82. See EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (ruling that the EEOC was
not bound by an arbitration agreement signed by an employee and was entitled to seek
both an injunction and damages on behalf of the employee).
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think are more in line with what we actually favor, which is toughening
up the standards for supervision of class action settlements. So I am not
too worried about that. I think that Rule 23(f), the right to appeal, is in
theory a two-way street. But my concern is that most of the time courts
of appeal are going to exercise their discretion to hear appeals when the
defendants have been ruled against in the lower courts. As for the
broader federalization of class actions, the Judicial Conference of the
United States has been quite strong in opposing that bill as it is written
now—because it is so sweeping. What their position would be if
somebody got wise and made it more narrow is a different question.
I should also say that there are some cases in which we have been
involved in state courts that have been actually worse than the federal
courts. We now have some federal courts of appeals willing to look at
some of these collusive settlements in ways that state courts are not
willing to look at them.
But it is clear to me that the statutory remedy of, in essence, giving the
right to go to federal court at any time in the class action is a terrible
idea, and one that I think will not get through simply because it is too
extreme. There is enough interest in the Senate to stop it through
filibuster if need be.
DAVID VLADECK:
This is a question that I think is principally directed toward Nadine.
There has been a spate of Supreme Court decisions resting on the
Eleventh Amendment that essentially forbids litigants from bringing
suits against states under statutes such as the age statute, the disability
act. What, if any, limit do you think there is to this progression? Where
do you see the Supreme Court heading with its Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence?
NADINE STROSSEN:
First of all, this is a regression, not a progression, and I just do not see
anything changing the five-to-four split without new appointments. And
it does not seem likely to me that the new appointments that we are
going to get are going to change it in a positive direction.
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DAVID VLADECK:
Someone suggested that the Spending Clause statutes, such as the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),83 which gives states
a stick but also the carrot of federal funding, may be the line the Court
ultimately draws. Do you see any promise in that occurring?
NADINE STROSSEN:
I am not optimistic only in the sense that I see the Court’s federalism
jurisprudence, especially when you take Bush v. Gore into account, as
being nothing but result oriented. Of course, we could make principled
arguments that would allow those cases to be distinguished, but
realistically I do not think this Court is going to be swayed. Or, more
appropriately, five members are not going to be swayed.
ALAN MORRISON:
I guess I disagree with that on the Spending Clause, in part because
you have got the abortion cases, among others. And I think there is an
even more potentially dangerous case coming up that should be on the
Court’s conference in a couple weeks, whether they are going to treat
sex discrimination like race discrimination, in which case you could deal
with it under the Fourteenth Amendment, or whether they’re going to
treat it like age or disability discrimination, in which case they are not
going to allow section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to override. That
is a really dangerous case.
TED SHAW:
The question that you asked goes right to the relationship between
Eleventh Amendment and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Of
course, the 1960 civil rights cases that went at discrimination through the
use of the Commerce Clause are the bedrock for all of this legislation
that has been passed. The question is: How far are they going to regress
in the race area, and will they touch any of that? So far, I think they
have drawn a line because, at least when it comes to race, it is clear that
Section 5 was intended to allow Congress to act in fighting racial
discrimination. But this has been a clear power grab by the Court. It has
been a fundamental shift in federalism, and there are separation of power
issues here that are profound. Like Nadine, I see the Court continuing to
progress in the same direction. I do not think anything but a change in
the composition of the Court is going to change this, and the question is,
when will they feel compelled to stop.
83.
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NADINE STROSSEN:
What is even more discouraging, I will not say depressing, but I will
say discouraging, is that when the whole civil rights and civil liberties
and religious communities banded together to pass a law to undo some
of the damage that the Supreme Court had done, not dealing with race
discrimination, but with religious freedom, the Court said that this act
overstepped unduly into its powers. It struck down as unconstitutional
the so-called Religious Freedom Restoration Act.84 So you are really
facing a bind here, where I guess the only avenue for action may be at
the state level.
I think we did not spend enough time on how extremely important it is
to mobilize all of our Senators and all of us who vote in senatorial
elections on every appointment to every court, not just the Supreme
Court, and also to pay attention to state court appointments.
DAVID VLADECK:
You have given me the perfect segue to the next question. What is the
fallout going to be concerning the Bush administration’s decision to shed
reliance on the ABA screening process for federal judicial nominations?
ALAN MORRISON:
I view it not as bad news, but as good news. Why do I say that? Not
only because I want to take the offensive and because we have got to be
optimistic about something, but because I never believed the ABA
screening process was worth very much anyway. My own view was that
they gave their imprimatur to a lot more bad guys than they kept out as a
result of it. That once you got the ABA’s approval, you were by the
door and anybody could say: “Well, I’ll vote for that person because the
ABA says she or he is qualified.”
So I look at it as an opportunity for us to do a couple things. The first
is to go on the offensive before there is a vacancy and for the people in
this room and many others to band together and to start thinking about
some criteria that we want to come forward with, some questions that we
want to ask, not because the questions are going to be answered any
more honestly or meaningfully than Attorney General Ashcroft
answered them at his confirmation hearing, but because we want to
know about the person and what they have done and how they have
84.

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
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practiced in their lives. We want to know what kind of background they
have and what their qualifications are for sitting on the bench,
particularly on the Supreme Court. And we should pull together a set of
criteria that people can agree upon and get those out on the table in
advance before there is a vacancy, as a means of emboldening the
members of the Judiciary Committee. If they have some agreed-upon
criteria, they can start to think about these issues in advance and in new
ways. This means talking to those on the Judiciary Committee sooner
rather than later, to remind them that there is a word in their vocabulary
which they seem to have forgotten, filibuster.
If the Republicans in control of the Senate thought that they were
entitled to filibuster Dr. Satcher when he was nominated for the mighty
post of Surgeon General of the United States because he dared mention
the word “abortion” sometime in his past, then surely those who feel
strongly about nominees for high federal court posts ought to be willing
to say the word “filibuster” and do something about it, instead of giving
the nominee a pass. The rules, in my judgment, were permanently
changed in the last six years by the Republicans in the Senate.
Those of us who care deeply about the Supreme Court and about the
lower federal courts have got to start doing something about this now,
before there is a vacancy, because what we are likely to see is what
happened in 1986 when there was a vacancy announced and on that
same day nominees were in place before anybody had the time to do
anything about it. I am hopeful that we will take the offensive,
remembering this may not be an offense in the sense that we assure
advantageous nominations; but, in the absence of a good offense, a good
defense is a good start.
TED SHAW:
I do not think that there is anything good that I can see from the ABA
being removed from the process. First of all, we are concerned not only
about the Supreme Court but also about the courts of appeals. I can tell
you that a lot of the focus of the current administration right now is on
the federal courts of appeals as well as the district courts. There are
many vacancies here right now that have been backed up. One of the
things that the ABA was able to do with its process and resources was to
track all of these nominations and do the investigation up front. I am not
sure how this is going to work now. Certainly, the nominee’s name is
not going to be made public in the way that it was before. To date, the
name was given to the ABA, and it would start the investigation right
away, assuring both an investigation and a time lag.
Look, here is what is behind what this Administration is doing: it is no
secret, you have seen the stories about it. People who are not on the
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bench are being told: “If you want to be on the bench, join the Federalist
Society.” We hear about judges who are either state court judges or
district court judges. If the state court judges want to move to the
federal district court or the federal court judges want to go the courts of
appeals, if you are not a member of the Federalist Society, it is not going
to happen. That is what we hear.
Certainly the Federalist Society is playing a very active role behind
the scenes right now and sometimes right up front in the selection of
these judges. All these vacancies exist because the Republicans, as we
know, held up so many nominations for so many years that now they
want to rush appointments through before there is a change in the
composition of the Senate.
One of the problems, as we know, is if you have a slim Democratic
majority in the Senate, you find that the Democrats do not tend to hold
fast in the same way that the Republicans do. So the scenario looks bad
to me. There is no question about that. I do not see a silver lining in it.
And while I am speaking to this issue, we fought for some years to
have a change in the court of appeals for the Fourth Circuit—more
African-Americans live in that circuit than in any other circuit. There
has never been an African-American appointed to the Fourth Circuit
until President Clinton appointed Roger Gregory as a recess appointee,
which means that the appointment expires with the expiration of this
current Congress, unless he is nominated by President Bush. President
Bush has made noises about nominating him, given the bad publicity.
But this is a circuit in which there have been all kinds of vacancies. The
chief judge is pulling up judges from district courts to fill out panels
because they have all these vacancies. A judicial emergency was
declared because there were so many vacancies. And the chief judge
was saying, while the Senate was blocking confirmation of AfricanAmerican and other appointees who they consider to be too liberal, that
the circuit does not want any more judges or need any more judges
because it would interfere with collegiality. Well, you understand what
that means. The Fourth Circuit has been the last segregated circuit up
until this recess appointment.
That is what is going on in the federal courts to some degree or
another, not only the Fourth Circuit, but in terms of getting appointments
filled everywhere. And now the Republicans want to rush this through;
the White House wants to rush these appointments through. Well, I
think that the loss of the ABA is going to mean that the Senate is going
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to have the Judiciary Committee play a much more active role and that
organizations are going to have to play a much more active role. But
frankly, Alan, I am very concerned about this spiraling down that we
have seen for the last ten years or so with respect to the nominations
process. It does not serve anybody’s interest to have this process
continue to spiral down into the kinds of battles that we have seen. I say
that without backing off one minute from opposing extremist nominees
from the court. But I think we have to find a way out of this; we have to
find a better way.
ALAN MORRISON:
I think your point about the lower courts is certainly well taken.
NADINE STROSSEN:
I agree with Ted that in the long run making this into a political battle
is not any good. On the other hand, I know that Ted agrees with me that
Clinton did not make it enough of a political battle. So I think for the
moment we have to recognize that, for all practical purposes, the
Constitution and civil liberties and civil rights (among the other public
interest causes we are talking about) are just not going to exist in reality
unless there is a judge who is willing to enforce the Constitution and the
laws, and every single nominee at every level has the effective capacity
to amend the Constitution. And just as I would fight against a
constitutional amendment to reduce individual rights, I am going to fight
against judicial nominees who would have the same impact.
ROBERT FELLMETH:
We are pretty much over time now, so let’s take one minute for each
of us to wrap up as we have in the previous panels. Give us your
thoughts on the two or three points you would most like to emphasize in
terms of taking the offensive to address access to the courts and bias in
the courts. Let’s start with Alan.
ALAN MORRISON:
Despite the pessimistic sound of this panel, as a confirmed litigator, I
am not about to give up. I think we have to keep litigating even if we
lose sometimes, for several important reasons. Sometimes a loss is
necessary as a prelude to legislative solution; arbitration cases are clearly
an example. Second, litigation continues to perform an enormous
function of educating the public about real injustices that they are not
aware of. Third, sometimes it is necessary to remind some people that
you can litigate to prevent them from doing worse things than they
would do if you didn’t take them to court. There are some limits, even
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in these courts and these days, where courts will draw lines. Fourth,
never forget the related blessing of embarrassment, that some people
will do things out of embarrassment even though they might not be
legally required to. And last, the beauty of the judicial forum is that they
do have to answer your charges in some way or another, assuming that
you get around the problem of standing. So we are not about to stop
litigating, and I hope you aren’t either.
TED SHAW:
As I said earlier, in spite of how bad the picture looks, the worst thing
we could do is to give in and give up. And the more we hear these
challenges, the more we have to be committed to the work we do. It just
means that there is work to be done.
One of the things that I always remind myself of is that this has
always been a very conservative country for the most part, and we had a
relatively short era that we can define as the Warren Court era that had
some bleed-over beyond the Warren Court. For the most part, that is the
period of time in which the Court became as aggressive as many of us
who do civil rights, civil liberties work, think is proper.
This kind of work is incremental. We have to continue to do it
because the other side is going to be in the courts, and we have to meet
them on every front, not only in the courts, but in the political arena, the
arena of public opinion, everywhere.
I am not disheartened at all, because I know that in the big picture,
over the long run, the whole story of the struggle for human rights and
civil liberties is a struggle in which we are prevailing. History is a
march toward progress, and as Martin Luther King said: “[T]he arc of
the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.”85 So even
though at any given moment we might think that things are looking
pretty grim, I know that progress is inevitable, and, even if we take a
step backwards once in a while, we are going to take a few more steps
forward tomorrow.
NADINE STROSSEN:
I absolutely agree with that, and, despite the assaults on the courts and
on their power and on their personnel, they still are, in many important
85. Martin Luther King Jr., Our God Is Marching On! (Mar. 25, 1965), available
at http://www.mlkonline.com/ourgod.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
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areas, serving their intended function. I am speaking mostly of the
federal courts now because of their relative insulation from political
pressure. They still are serving their intended function as the ultimate
safety net for individual and minority rights that are not adequately
protected in the political process.
So I think it is important to talk about some of the ways in which
courts are serving that function in spite of all the setbacks. I would like
to mention two examples on our agenda. If you look at all of the
Internet censorship laws that have been passed both by Congress and by
states all over the country, we have now challenged about a dozen of
them. These have real implications, not only for freedom of speech but
also for equality rights. If you look at what is being censored, it includes
much expression of and about women and women’s rights and
reproductive freedom, as well as lesbians and gay men. I think that the
latest law that Congress passed is a good example of how rights of poor
people, who, unfortunately, are disproportionately racial minorities, are
particularly under assault because the censorship is aimed at the public
libraries and the public schools, where these individuals tend to have
their only access to the Internet. Look at the court rulings in these cases;
we have not only won every single one of them, but we also have the
affirmative vote of every single judge, including the entire United States
Supreme Court. We have prevailed before three dozen different judges
appointed by Presidents going all the way back to Richard Nixon.
Contrast that with the lopsided supermajorities which these laws obtain
in their passage by the elected branches of government. The contrast you
see is not between Republicans and Democrats; it is not between
conservatives and liberals; it is between elected officials and judges,
those who take an oath to uphold the Constitution and who are able to
have a little bit of insulation from the political process and keep that oath.
The other example I would like to offer is reproductive freedom.
Consider the badly mislabeled so-called partial birth abortion bans,
which have been struck down by the United States Supreme Court six to
three.86 And if you look at the lower court rulings, again, in virtually
every single one of these cases the courts have done the very politically
unpopular thing, including very conservative judges appointed by very
conservative Presidents. Now having said that, there are limits to
litigation success in other areas, on racial justice, certainly affirmative
action. We are winning some in the lower courts, but the Supreme Court
warrants pessimism there.
We need to see litigation more and more as part of a multipronged
strategy, and this picks up a little bit on what Alan was saying.
86.
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Litigation can function as a tool that we use for purposes of public
education, for purposes of prompting voluntary governmental reform,
for purposes of prompting legislative reform. And even all of you out
there, or most of you, who may think of yourselves as litigators, I want
to encourage you to use your knowledge of the law and your
commitment to the public interest to advocate in forums other than
courts of law, to advocate in the public arena, to advocate through
grassroots organizing, to advocate through lobbying elected members of
government as well. Your knowledge and your skills as lawyers will
serve you and our causes in those other arenas as well.
PAT STURDEVANT:
I think Nadine is exactly right, and this example of multifaceted
advocacy is what we have to push for the future. I also think that it is
essential that we take another look at the issues that we are advocating
and find overarching issues that appeal not only to the consumer
movement but also to the civil rights movement. An excellent example
of an issue ripe for multiforum attack is mortgage lending—now the
scourge of communities all across the country. It particularly disadvantages
elderly African-American widows. It is a national disgrace. It is causing
individuals to lose their homes and the equity in their homes, it is
disrupting neighborhoods, and it is disrupting communities. It has
gotten a great deal of attention from regulators at the national level and
from the media all across the country. It provides one immediate and
important opportunity for us to come together and work collaboratively
in the courts, agencies, legislatures, and before the public.
ROBERT FELLMETH:
Thanks, Pat. I want to wrap up by directing your attention to the
exhibits in this Session’s materials and their specific recommendations.
We were not able to get into a lot of them. Many of them do attack
problems we have been discussing. There is an exhibit on mandamus as
an alternative class action.87 There is one on the Castano case litigation
model, which is what Pat is talking about in terms of combining together
with private partnerships.88 There is an article on the Unfair Competition

87. See Fellmeth, supra note 3, at 7.
88. See Myron Levin, As Tobacco Litigation Goes, Castano Suit Is Super Bowl,
L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1996, at A1.
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Act alternative that Pat discussed briefly, and so did Alan.89 There is the
California Corporate Criminal Liability Act,90 which brings public
prosecutors into this sphere. There is also a model Independent Legal
Technician Statute. We did not discuss in depth the costs of legal
access, a serious issue, but that model is a promising proposal in that
area. The position paper of the NACA on Consumer Contracts and
Arbitration Clauses and suggestions there is included.91 The exhibits
also include an article by Alan Morrison concerning protective orders,
setting forth solutions to that problem.92
So although we have listed and discussed many problems, we also
have some solutions on the table. They are possible avenues of attack,
and we have to begin to think about and talk about them. In the final
analysis, it may come down to the media being able to put these issues
on the public agenda table, which as we discussed, has occurred where
we generate emotive horror stories. These drive the media and drive the
legislators who often legislate in an anecdotal fashion. We have to use
that, perhaps regrettably. But we have to use the biases of the media to
get them beyond celebrities, cute animal stories, and petty ironies. We
have to learn to bend our stories in their direction in a way so that they
reach the public agenda. We do not do well in the lobbies; we do not do
well where money counts; but, we do well if the public sees what is at
stake in human terms.
So with that, I want to thank the panel for their contribution to our
understanding of court strategy alternatives.

89. See Fellmeth, supra note 6, at 1.
90. CAL. PENAL CODE § 387 (West 1999).
91. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES, POSITION PAPER: REASONS
TO OPPOSE PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN CONSUMER CONTRACTS (2000) (on file
with author).
92. Alan B. Morrison, Protective Orders, Plaintiffs, Defendants and the Public
Interest in Disclosure; Where Does the Balance Lie?, 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 109 (1989).
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